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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2 and 78-2a-4. 
SCOPE OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
By order of the court dated August 5, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court granted review 
by certiorari limited to the following issues: (1) Whether the Nollan/Dolan (Nollan v. 
Califnornia Coastal Comm % 483 U.S. 825,841-42 (1987) mdDolan v. CityofTigard, 374, 
377 (sic) (1994) "rough proportionality" test applies where an alleged taking results from a 
uniform legislative land-use scheme rather than an ad hoc site-specific adjudicative decision; 
(2) whether the court of appeals erred in holding the district court's review was limited to the 
administrative record; and (3) whether Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits review 
regardless of the state of the administrative record. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the Nollan/Dolan (Nollan v. California Coastal Comm yn, 
483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) and Dolan v. City ofTigard, 374, 377 (1994) heightened 
scrutiny "rough proportionality" test applies where an alleged taking results from a uniform 
legislative land-use scheme rather than an ad hoc site-specific adjudicative decision. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding the district court' s review 
was limited to the administrative record. 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits review regardless 
of the state of the administrative record. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In a facial constitutional challenge, a municipal ordinance withstands constitutional 
attack if it "debatably promotes the legitimate [governmental] goals of increased public 
health, safety, or general welfare." Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 253 
(Utah Ct. Apps. 1998); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,388,47 S.Ct. 
114,118 (1926). A facial takings challenge must show that a municipal regulation does not 
"substantially advance legitimate state interests." Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374,385, 
114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code. Ann Sec. 17-27-1001(a) 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-801 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-807 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 11-36-101, et. seq.. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-90a-l, et. seq. 
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances Sec. 18.08.010 {see App. "2") 
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances Sec. 15.28.010 {see App. "2") 
United State Constitution, Amend. V 
Utah State Constitution, Art. l,Sec. 22 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This case involves claims asserted by Respondent and Cross-Petitioner B.A.M. 
Development, LLC [hereinafter, "BAM"], a subdivision developer, that Petitioner and 
Cross-Respondent Salt Lake County [hereinafter, the "County"] violated BAM's 
constitutional guarantees of just compensation for "takings" of private property by requiring 
an "exaction" of a certain area of BAM's property where it adjoins a state highway as a 
condition of the county's approval of a proposed subdivision plan, to-wit: a dedication of 
certain road width as needed to comply with the County's highway width ordinance. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW: 
• August 14, 1998 - BAM's Complaint filed in Third District Court [R. 1 - 13]. 
• April 23 and 24, 2001 - Case was tried in a bench trial before Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson [R. 353, 354 (internal pagination, pp. 1 - 330)]. 
• May 21, 2001 - Closing argument heard by Judge Hanson [R. 355]. 
• June 8, 2001 - Trial court entered a Memorandum Decision finding in favor 
of the County on all claims asserted in BAM's Complaint, and directing the 
County's counsel to prepare proposed findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law [R. 247 - 252]. 
• July 30, 2001 - Trial court entered a second Memorandum Decision finding 
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that (a) BAM's counsel had not timely objected to the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted to the court by the County's counsel; 
and (b) the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted to 
the court by the County's counsel fairly and accurately represented the court's 
decision. [R. 258 - 259]. The same day, the trial court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 266 -273], and its Judgment for Defendant 
[R. 274 - 275]. 
August 1, 2001 - BAM simultaneously filed in the trial court a "Motion for 
Entry of New and/or Additional Findings" and "Motion for New Trial" [R. 
276 - 279] along with a purported "Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact"[R. 
280-291]. 
August 16, 2001 - The County filed its memoranda in opposition to BAM's 
Motion for Entry of New and/or Additional Findings and Motion for New 
Trial [R. 292 - 328]. 
September 19, 2001 - Trial court filed a third Memorandum Decision, denying 
BAM's Motion for Entry of New and/or Additional Findings and Motion for 
New Trial for the reasons set forth in the County's August 16,2001 opposition 
memoranda, and directed the County's counsel to prepare a proposed Order to 
effectuate the denial of BAM's motions [R. 335- 337]. 
October 15, 2001 - Trial court entered Order denying BAM's Motion for 
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Entry of New and/or Additional Findings [R. 338 -340]. 
• October 18, 2002 - BAM filed Notice of Appeal and Bond for Costs on 
Appeal [R. 341 - 344]. 
• December 24, 2001 - Utah Supreme Court entered Order transferring appeal 
to Utah Court of Appeals [R. 346]. 
• February 20, 2004 - Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion and decision, 
BAM Development, LLC v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 2004 UT App 34 
(see,App. "1"). 
• August 5, 2004 - Utah Supreme Court granted the parties' petition and cross-
petition for writ of certiorari. 
B. Statement of Facts * 
1. On July 30, 1997, Salt Lake County [hereinafter, "the County"] received the 
application and plat of plaintiff B.A.M. Development [ "BAM"] for its proposed Westridge 
Meadows subdivision ["Westridge"] to be developed at approximately 7700 West 3500 
South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's proposed plat indicated a 40-foot 
highway dedication at 3500 South Street running along the north boundary of BAM's 
property. BAM's fee simple interest in the parcel proposed by subdivision development 
extended to the center line of 3500 South street. 
2. On August 26,1997, BAM's subdivision proposal was approved by Salt Lake 
lrThis Statement of Facts adopts the "Findings of Fact" as entered by the trial court 
[R. 266 - 269]. The trial court's factual findings are not challenged by BAM. 
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County engineering staff, subject to compliance with County roadway standards, including 
a 40-foot right-of-way ["ROW"] highway dedication of 3500 South, which was and is a state 
highway, running along the portion of BAM's proposed subdivision which abutted said 
highway. 
3. The County's ROW requirement was imposed pursuant to Salt Lake County 
Ordinance 15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 18-27-801. The 
County ordinance requires dedication of highway ROW space by developers of abutting 
property in accordance with the County's "Transportation Master Plan." 
4. The County relied upon traffic projections and recommendations from the 
Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Utah Department of Transportation in formulating 
its Transportation Master Plan. The road-width recommendations of the Wasatch Front 
Regional Council were based upon a long-range transportation study projecting highway 
capacity needs in Salt Lake County to the year 2020. 
5. Prior to receiving final subdivision approval from the County, BAM closed its 
purchase of the proposed subdivision parcel, although BAM had entered into its purchase 
contract to acquire the parcel subject to the contingency that it must receive County approval 
for its proposed subdivision. 
6. On September 15, 1997, the Utah Department of Transportation ["UDOT"] 
received BAM's amended subdivision plan from the County for its approval. UDOT 
responded with a required 53-foot half-width highway ROW on the portion of BAM's 
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property abutting 3500 South. 
7. On or about June 10, 1998, the County's transportation engineer was informed 
by the Wasatch Front Regional Council and UDOT that the currently required highway ROW 
for 3500 South at the relevant location was 106-feet total width (i.e., 53-foot half-width). 
The County then incorporated the revised ROW requirement into its Transportation Master 
Plan. 
8. On or about June 15,1998, the County transportation engineer approved BAM's 
subdivision proposal subject to compliance with current Salt Lake County roadway 
standards, including the 53-foot half-width ROW dedication of 3500 South. 
9. On June 23,1998, the County planning commission gave preliminary approval 
to BAM's amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street. 
10. On July 2, 1998, BAM's attorney filed a Notice of Appeal of the Planning 
Commission's dedication requirement of a 53-foot ROW, rather than a ROW of 40 feet. 
BAM's appeal did not challenge any other conditions of subdivision approval imposed by 
the County. 
11. On July 15,1998, the Board of County Commissioners denied BAM's appeal. 
12. On June 23, 1999, the County planning commission approved BAM's 
amended subdivision plat, which had been modified to include the required 53-foot highway 
dedication. 
13. On August 18, 1999, the Board of County Commissioners granted final 
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approval of the Westridge subdivision plat (with the 53-foot highway dedication). 
14. On August 27,1999, the Westridge subdivision plat was recorded with the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's Office; BAM thereafter constructed the subdivision. 
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SUMMARY OF THE COUNTY'S ARGUMENT 
1. No unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just compensation 
occurred in this case under the United States or Utah constitutions where the County's 
highway dedication ordinance required dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and 
comprehensive "legislative" transportation scheme, rather than an ad hoc, site-specific 
"adjudicative"decision. While the county's exaction meets the "essential nexus" testof 
Nollan, the "rough properionality"analysis of the United States Supreme Court's Dolan 
decision regarding development "exactions" is not applicable in this case. 
2. The court of appeals correctly held that the district court's review is generally 
limited to the administrative record pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sec. 17-27-1001. 
3. Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits the filing of this matter as an 




No unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just 
compensation occurred in this case under the United States or Utah 
constitutions where the County's highway dedication ordinance required 
dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive 
"legislative" transportation scheme, rather than an ad hoc, site-specific 
"adjudicative"decision. Thus, the Dolan "rough proportionality" test 
does not apply in this case. 
BAM asserts that the County's subdivision approval and highway-dedication 
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legislative scheme is "facially flawed" under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
and Art. 1, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution2. In a facial challenge, "...the challenger need 
not 'seek a final decision regarding the application of the regulation to the property at issue 
before the government entity charged with its implementation.'" Smith Investment Co. v. 
Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(citation omitted). This is because a 
facial challenge to an ordinance is deemed ripe at the moment of its enactment. On the 
opposite hand, a facial challenger bears a "heavy burden" in attacking an ordinance, even an 
"extraordinary one," because courts have a "strong reluctance" to proclaim a municipal 
legislative act as facially invalid, and "will resolve any doubts in favor of the ordinance's 
constitutionality." Id., 958 P.2d at 251 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
The County's requirement that BAM dedicate a portion of its property for highway 
right-of-way as a condition of development approval was the result of a general legislative 
prescription, not an individualized adjudicative decision. BAM has never contended in this 
litigation that it only objects to the manner in which the County highway dedication 
ordinance was applied with particularity to BAM (i.e., an "as applied" challenge), as opposed 
to the ordinance per se. BAM has also never contended that the County failed to adhere to 
its own ordinance, or to the applicable state statutes, when it imposed the exaction in this 
case. Thus, BAM's challenge is to the ordinance itself because, according to BAM, it 
results in an uncompensated taking of private property (i.e., a "facial challenge"). 
2Appellant's Brief, Utah Court of Appeals, p. 11. 
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The Court of Appeals' decision effectively remands this litigation to the County 
administrative process to conduct a formal evidentiary hearing on BAM's administrative 
appeal, and to create a record thereof. Because the Court of Appeals decided this case on 
procedural grounds, it did not address in any detail the "legislative" vs. "adjudicative" 
distinction which is the focus of the instant appeal. The Court of Appeals did, however, 
summarily conclude that because BAM was required to dedicate an additional 13 feet right-
of-way as a condition of development approval, the so-called Nollan/Dollan "rough 
proportionality" analysis3 would apply. The County maintains that the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that the "rough proportionality" test of the Nollan and Dolan decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court should guide the County's administrative decision making, and any 
subsequent appellate review. 
The dominant contemporary federal "takings"jurisprudence governing development 
"exactions," such as required dedication of land for roads and highways, derives chiefly from 
two United States Supreme Court cases4. First, in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm 'n, 483 
3As discussed in detail below (see pp. 32-33, infra), this Nollan/Dolan "test" 
actually involves two separate and distinct tests. 
4Although BAM asserts takings claims under comparable provisions of the Utah 
Constitution (Art. I, §22) as well as the Federal Constitution (Amend. V), this discussion 
focuses on authority generated under the Federal Constitution's takings clause. 
Generally, where there is no showing that comparable provisions of the Utah Constitution 
and the Federal Constitution should be interpreted differently, Utah courts will look to the 
Federal Constitution. State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 90 (fn.4) (Utah 1993). Cf, Snyder v. 
Murray City Corp., 73 P.3d 325, fn.4 (Utah 2003)(where only the Utah Constitution was 
placed at issue, analysis of the comparable provision of the Federal Constitution was not 
controlling). 
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U.S. 825,107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987), the plaintiffs/landowners sought approval from a California 
agency to rebuild their beachfront house. The agency granted the approval, subject to the 
condition that the plaintiffs dedicate a public easement behind their house, along the shore, 
so that the public could pass freely between the two public beaches bordering the plaintiffs1 
property. Finding the required dedication invalid, the Court accepted as legitimate the 
agency's concern that the house that the plaintiffs proposed to build would block visual 
access to the beach and create a "psychological barrier" to its use by the public. But the Court 
considered the requirement of a public easement behind the house to be unrelated to that 
interest, because it did nothing to enhance visual access of the beach from the street or to 
overcome any psychological barrier. Instead, the easement merely facilitated use of the public 
beaches by people already aware of and using them. Thus, the Court concluded that the 
dedication lacked an "essential nexus" between the condition imposed and the government 
interest in imposing it, which rendered the dedication a taking. Id. at 841-42,107 S.Ct. 3141. 
In short, although the Court declined to deem the condition a per se taking as it had for other 
physical invasions or dedications of property interests, the Court required that there be a 
logical connection between the governmental interest to be served and the particular 
condition imposed on the landowner. 
However, Nollan failed to explicitly characterize the requisite degree or nature of the 
relationship between the governmental interest and the development condition imposed. In 
1994, the Court granted certiorari in Dolanv. CityofTigard, 512 U.S. 374,114 S.Ct. 2309, 
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for the express purpose of settling that unresolved issue. Id., 512 U.S. at 377. In Dolan, the 
property owner sought city approval to double the size of her retail store and to pave her 
parking lot. As a condition of approval, the city required the owner to dedicate a 15-foot strip 
of land for use as a pedestrian path and bikeway and also to dedicate a portion of her property 
within the 100-year flood plain for a publicly accessible "greenway." The city defended the 
bikeway requirement with a calculation that the increased size of the retail store would add 
937 car trips per week and that the bikeway "could" help to offset the increased traffic. The 
city defended the flood plain dedication on the basis that paving the gravel parking lot would 
increase the amount of impermeable ground, thus adding to flooding from the adjacent and 
already overburdened creek. Id. at 379-82. 
The Court, in examining the dedications, established a two-step inquiry for analyzing 
regulatory takings claims in the context of conditional use or development permits. First, as 
it had in Nollan, the Court examined whether there was an "essential nexus" between the 
conditions and legitimate governmental interests, such that the purpose to be served by the 
condition was the same as the government's interest in the use restriction. The Court found 
that nexus requirement readily satisfied. More specifically, the Court determined that there 
was a logical relationship between relieving traffic congestion and requiring a bike path and 
between the increased risk of flooding due to the parking lot and requiring property within 
the local flood plain to remain undeveloped. 512 U.S. at 387-889. Second, having determined 
that the "essential nexus" inquiry was satisfied, the Court turned to the degree of connection 
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between the dedications and the projected impact of the proposed development. Id. at 388. 
The Court held that there must be "rough proportionality" between a development's 
projected impacts and the exactions required of the property owner as a condition of 
development, and emphasized that it was requiring only approximate, or "rough," 
proportionality: "No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make 
some effort to quantify its finding in support of the dedication ... beyond the conclusory 
statement that it could offset some of the [impacts of the development].ff Id. at 395-96. But 
the government "must make some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." 
Id. at 391 (emphasis added). 
It is perfectly sensible that an individualized {i.e., ad hoc) development exaction 
should require an individualized determination of the relationship between the exaction and 
the impact which the exaction seeks to remedy. Thus, when local building approvals are 
requested by developers, exactions are sometimes established ad hoc based on unique 
characteristics of the development proposal or the land on which it will be located. Courts 
have categorized such exactions as "adjudicative" local government decisions because they 
arise on an individualized (and frequently negotiated) basis, and are not the result of a 
general, universally applied legislative regulation. 
Since Dolan, courts have split as to whether the Dolan portion of the Nollan/Dolan 
test applies where, as here, the development condition flows from a general legislative 
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scheme rather than an adjudicative decision. The distinction between a "legislative" mandate 
and an "adjudicative" requirement is the heart of this appeal. 
Here, the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not address the County's 
argument, embraced by the trial court, that the Dolan "rough proportionality" component of 
the analysis does not apply in this case5. The trial court correctly concluded as a matter of 
law that dedications required of a subdivision developer in order to comply with the County's 
highway-dedication ordinance are qualitatively different than the exactions analyzed in the 
Nollan and Dolan cases, which were ad hoc, site-specific adjudicatory decisions by local 
land-use authorities. The highway-dedication ordinance at issue here, involves a generally 
applicable legislative assessment (or "exaction"), not one which is imposed individually. 
This distinction is crucial to determining the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to the 
5The dissent referred to the "adjudicative" vs. "legislative" issue in passing, but 
made very little actual analysis of this distinction. However, while admitting that this 
issue is "unsettled," the dissent criticized the distinction on two grounds: (1) "[i]t is not 
clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmental entity 
responsible for the taking"(BAMDevelopment v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 733, 
2004 WL 316141, [^56 (emphasis added)); and (2) that "it is not always easy to tell the 
difference between an individualized, adjudicative decision and a 'uniformly imposed' 
legislative scheme." Id., [^57. Neither of these arguments carry the day in this case. First, 
the County has never argued that applicability of the Dolan test in any way turns on the 
"type of governmental entity" which seeks to impose the exaction. On the contrary, the 
County maintains that the same constitutional test should apply identically no matter 
what type of governmental entity is involved. Second, it is not the least bit difficult in 
this case to distinguish between the "legislative" or the "adjudicative" character of the 
County's highway dedication ordinance. The ordinance is, rather, clearly a legislative 
scheme of general application; it was not applied by bureaucratic fiat to BAM through the 
individualized, discretionary judgment of any County administrator, but rather was the 
mandate of the plain language of the ordinance. 
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County's ordinance6. First, it is necessary to review the statutory scheme under which the 
County derives its authority to regulate highway dedications. 
(A) Utah's Statutory Scheme for County Regulation of Subdivision Development 
Utah statute grants authority to the counties for regulating development of 
subdivisions within their boundaries. The County Land Use Development and Management 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-101 to -1003 (2001), authorizes counties "to enact all 
ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and development 
ofland within the county.. .unless . . . expressly prohibited by law." Id. Sec. 17-27-102(1). 
First, Sec. 17-27-102(1) confers a general grant of authority upon counties to regulate land 
use: 
"To accomplish the purposes of this chapter, and in order to provide for the 
health, safety, and welfare,... counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions, 
and rules that they consider necessary for the use and development of land 
within th county, including ordinances ... governing [land] uses, density, open 
spaces, structures, buildings,... [and] transportation ... ." 
(Emphasis added). Chapter 27 creates express power in the counties to regulate and approve 
development of subdivisions. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-801 provides as follows: 
"Enactment of subdivision ordinance. 
6
 In recognizing the legislative/adjudicative distinction, the Dolan court 
specifically noted that "[t]he sort ofland use regulations discussed in the case just cited 
[upholding the regulations], however, differ in two relevant particulars from the present 
case. First, they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of 
the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's 
application for a building permit on an individual parcel." Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at 385 
(J. Rehnquist). 
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"The legislative body of any county may enact a subdivision ordinance 
requiring that a subdivision plat comply with the provisions of the subdivision 
ordinance and be approved as required by this part before: 
(1) it may be filed or recorded in the county recorders office; and 
(2) lots may be sold." 
Subsection 807 requires that the recordation of an approved final subdivision plat acts 
as a dedication of the streets specified therein for public use: 
"Dedication of streets. 
"(1) Plats, when made, acknowledged, and recorded according to the 
procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all streets and 
other public places, and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the county for 
the public for the uses named or intended in those plats." 
(Emphasis added). Under the authority of the foregoing statutes, Salt Lake County enacted 
its Subdivision Ordinance (Chap. 18, Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances ["SLCCO"]). 
The Subdivision Ordinance provides a comprehensive scheme for application, review and 
approval of a subdivision, and contains numerous provisions specifically applicable to the 
instant case. First, Sec. 18.08.010 provides the general outline for subdivision application 
and approval procedure. In conjunction with the subdivision ordinance, the County in this 
case was required to apply its highway-dedication ordinance (SLCCO Sec. 15.28.010). That 
ordinance provides in relevant part as follows: 
15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required. 
"... no building or structure shall be erected, reconstructed, structurally altered 
or enlarged, and no building permit shall be issued therefor, on any lot or 
parcel of land which abuts a major or secondary highway, as shown on the 
map entitled,' Official Maj or and Secondary Highway Plan, Salt Lake County,' 
... or other public street which does not conform to current county width 
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standards, unless the portion of such lot or parcel within the right-of-way of 
the highway to be widened or additional required street width has been 
dedicated to the county and improved." 
(Emphasis added). Thus, under its ordinance, the County cannot approve a subdivision plan 
that does not dedicate sufficient highway right-of-way to conform to "current county [road] 
width standards." Id.. There is no issue in this case as to whether the County varied from 
the terms of its own ordinances. BAM has never claimed in this case that the County either 
failed to apply, or exceeded the scope of, its own ordinances. 
Before BAM submitted its amended 44-lot subdivision plat in compliance with the 
Planning Commission's first preliminary approval, the County had adopted a modification 
of its "Transportation Master Plan" map7. Consequently, when the Planning Commission 
gave its preliminary approval to BAM's amended plat, it incorporated the updated 53-foot 
ROW in compliance with Ordinance Sec. 15.28.010. The County took this action because 
under its own ordinance, it was required to. It was necessary to apply the ordinance to BAM 
solely because BAM's property abutted a highway. 
(B) The County Subdivision and Highway Dedication Ordinance, as a 
Legislative Measure of General Application, Is Not Subject to a Dolan 
Analysis 
7Undisputed trial testimony established that the "Transportation Master Plan Map," 
though under different nomenclature, is the same thing as the "Official Major and 
Secondary Highway Plan, Salt Lake County" referenced in the Ordinance. See, Statement 
of Facts, supra, *fl; see also trial testimony of Andrea Pullos [R. 353 (internal p. 157,1. 
24-p . 158,1.180)]. 
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The Court of Appeals found that a development "exaction" (i.e., the highway-
dedication requirement) is unconstitutional if it is not "roughly proportionate" to the 
anticipated impact of the particular development upon municipal infrastructure and services. 
Thus, under the Court of Appeals' application of Nollan/Dolan, an "individualized 
determination" of the proportionality between the exaction and the impact is required of the 
County when it enforces the highway-dedication ordinance. 
The County's highway-dedication requirement operates independently of any unique 
or individual topographical characteristics or proposed uses of specific parcels to which it 
applies. As with any subdivider who chooses to develop a parcel which abuts a highway, 
BAM was required here to comply with a uniform legislative scheme which expects all 
similarly situated subdividers8 to dedicate highway rights-of-way consistent with current 
uniform road-width standards. Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to ensuring that 
community development occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation 
planning. Otherwise, road-width requirements for new construction along major traffic 
corridors would vary radically from parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size, usage, and other 
impact characteristics of each individual parcel. In practical effect, this "individualized" 
impact analysis would require a different road-width dedication for every single parcel 
located along the side of a highway. Rather than having roadway segments with even and 
8
"Similarly situated" developers are those who, like BAM, develop property which 
abuts a major or secondary highway. See County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 15.28.010 
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consistent widths, road edges and shoulders, road boundaries would be required to jut in and 
out in front of each abutting parcel, as dictated by an "individualized determination" of each 
parcel's traffic impact. The absurd practical consequences of this application of Dolan 
"rough proportionality" in such a case are obvious. 
This distinction between a generally-applied "legislative," and a site-specific 
"adjudicative," decision is critical to determining the proper analysis for constitutional 
"takings" review. In the recent California Supreme Court case of San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. 
City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87,27 Cal.4th 643,117 Cal. Rptr.2d (Cal. 2002), 
this very distinction was discussed at length, and specifically in the context of the 
Nollan/Dolan "proportionality" analysis. There, the plaintiff-hotel owner sought a city 
permit to convert a long-term rental housing facility into a short-term tourist rental facility. 
The city imposed a "housing replacement" exaction which required plaintiff- and all other 
residential hotel conversion applicants - to provide replacement comparable residential 
housing units or pay an in lieu fee to a city-administered fund. Id., 41 P.3d at 92. The court 
distinguished the replacement-housing exaction from an "ad hoc" individualized recreation 
fee imposed by a municipality on condominium developer which it previously invalidated9. 
The San Remo court noted that in its earlier case, the city had 
"relied on no specific legislative mandate to impose the fee condition and no 
legislatively set formula to calculate its size [;] the [fee] condition was 
imposed ad hoc, entirely at the discretion of the city council and staff." 
'See, Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 12 Cal.4th 854 (Cal. 1996). 
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Id., 41 P.3d at 104 (citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 434-435). By 
contrast, San Francisco's housing-replacement exaction in San Remo, which the court 
ultimately upheld, was a '"generally applicable development fee or assessment... imposed 
not 'individually' but 'pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability.'"/^., 41 P.3d 
at 105 (emphasis in original). The court added that, "[t]he 'sine qua nort for application of 
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is thus the 'discretionary deployment of the police power' in 'the 
imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases" (id., 41 P.3d at 105 (citation omitted)), 
reasoning that "[wjhile legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper 
leveraging [by a municipality], such generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary 
restraints of the democratic political process10." Id.. Thus the court upheld the housing-
replacement scheme, affording a "deferential" level of scrutiny to the city's "generally 
legislated" exaction scheme. 
Other recent cases have produced similar results. For example, in Rogers Machinery 
v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. Apis. 2002), rev. den. (Or. Sp. Ct.) 52. P.3d 
1057, cert. den. (U.S. Sp. Ct.) 538 U.S. 903,123 S.Ct. 1482, a developer challenged a county 
ordinance assessing a traffic impact fee (TIF) designed to defray road improvement costs. 
The court found that the TIF was imposed according to a generally-applied, legislative 
formula, that it did not involve the exercise of ad hoc adjudicative discretion, and that it was 
10Similarly, in the present case, BAM's remedy for what it perceives as unfair 
County subdivision development conditions is a legislative remedy, not a judicial one. 
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mandatory on broad classes of property. Id., 45 P.3d at 981-982. Thus, the court held, the 
TIF "does not fall with the express reach or implicit rationale of Dolan's heightened scrutiny 
test." Id.. 
"The legislative-versus-adjudicative imposition of a development condition 
has proved especially significant for courts that have extended Dolan fs 
heightened scrutiny test to monetary exactions. With near uniformity, lower 
courts applying Dolan to monetary exactions have done so only when the 
exaction has been imposed through an adjudicatory process; they have 
expressly declined to use Dolan fs heightened scrutiny in testing development 
or impact fees imposed on broad classes of property pursuant to legislatively 
adopted fee schemes." 
Id. 45 P.3d at 971 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Home Builders Ass'n of Central 
Arizona v. City ofScottsdale, 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997), a city development fee was upheld 
under Dolan scrutiny because the Dolan court 
"was careful to point out that a city's adjudicative decision to impose a 
condition tailored to the particular circumstances of an individual case," [but] 
"[b]ecause the Scottsdale case involves a generally applicable legislative 
decision by the city, the court of appeals [below] thought Dolan did not apply. 
We agree, though the question has not been settled by the Supreme Court." 
Id., 930 P.3d at 1000 (emphasis in original). In Home Builders Ass }n of Northern California 
v. City of Napa, 108 Cal.Rptr.2s 60 (Cal. Ct. Apl. 1st Dist. 2001) the city had required 
developers through its "inclusionary housing" ordinance to set aside a specified percentage 
of new units for low or moderate income housing. Plaintiffs takings challenge under 
Nollan/Dolan was rejected by the court 
"... because Nollan and Dolan are inapplicable under the facts of this 
case.'[T]he intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny formulated by the high 
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court in Nollan and Dolan is intended to address ... land use 'bargains' 
between property owners and regulatory bodies - those in which the local 
government conditions permit approval for a given use on t]he owner's 
surrender of benefits which purportedly offset the impact of the proposed 
development... [Individualized development fees warrant a type of review 
akin to the conditional conveyances at issue in Nollan and Dolan, where 
generally applicable development fees warrant the more deferential review that 
the Dolan court recognized is generally accorded to legislative 
determinations.'" 
Id., 108 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 65 - 66 (quoted citations omitted; emphasis added). Likewise, in 
Arcadia Development Corp. v. CityofBloomington, 552N.W.2d281 (Minn. Ct. Apis. 1996), 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a city ordinance which required mobile home park 
owners who close their parks to pay relocation costs for displaced residents. The court 
rejected plaintiffs urged application ofDolan, stating that 
"... cases interpreting Dolan have confined its 'rough proportionality' analysis 
to adjudicative land-use dedication situation or to classic 'subdivision 
exaction' cases ... Because this case involves a challenge to a city-wide, 
legislative land-use regulation, Dolan's 'rough proportionality' test does not 
apply." 
Id., 552 N.W. 2d at 286.11 Here, the County's highway-dedication ordinance is just such a 
county-wide, generally-applicable legislative scheme, uniformly imposing a regulatory 
uFor additional examples of decisions upholding a regulation or exaction under a 
Dolan analysis on the basis of the legislative/adjudicative distinction, also see, Greater 
Atlanta Home Builders' Ass 'n v. De Kalb County, 588 S.E.2d 694, 697 (Ga. 2003); 
Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 695-696 (Colo. 2001); Garneau v. 
City of Seattle, 147 F3d 802, 811 (C.A. 9 1998); Home Builders'Ass 'n of Cent Arizona 
v. City ofScottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997); Home Builders'Ass'n of Dayton 
v. City of Beaver Creek, Case Nos. 94 CV 0012, 94 CV 0062, Ohio Comm. PI. (1996) 
at 17-18 (not reported in N.E. 2d); Pringle v. City of Wichita, 917 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Kan. 
App. 1996); San Mateo County Coastal Landowners' Ass 'n v. County of San Mateo, et. 
al, 45 Cal.Rptr. 2d 117, 131-132 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1995); Harris v. City of Wichita, 
Sedgwick County, Kansas, 862 F.Supp. 287, 293-294 (D.Kan. 1994). 
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standard for road-width dedication by subdivision developers12. These standards are 
designed to ensure that new subdivisions which abut major or secondary highways will 
conform to current highway width and design standards as part of a regional transportation 
plan designed to accommodate future community growth and traffic demands. 
Consequently, the highway-dedication requirement necessarily affects only those 
developers whose property abuts a major or secondary highway. The ordinance utilizes a 
legislatively adopted "formula" that standardizes road-width dedication based upon the size, 
location, type, and projected traffic volume of each highway in the county. The exaction in 
this case then, is not an "ad hoc" discretionary exaction imposed on an individualized basis 
at the whim of some bureaucrat, or based on unique impact factors attributable exclusively 
to BAM's particular development. Rather, as the trial court concluded, the County highway-
dedication ordinance 
"imposes the requirement of dedication on a broad class of property owners 
who choose to develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway 
[and] the assessment of how much property had to dedicated was not 
individualized, but rather was made pursuant to the generally applicable 
County Transportation Master Plan and applied across the board to all owners 
whose property abutted 3500 South." 
Memorandum Decision, p. 3 [R. 249]. As such, it should be accorded deferential scrutiny 
on review and upheld so long as it "advances a legitimate governmental interests." 
nSee also, Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 201-
02, 204(Ga. 1994) (refusing to apply Dolan to city parking lot ordinance requiring owners 
to install barrier curbs and landscaping improvements), cert, denied, 515 U.S. 1116, 115 
S. Ct. 2268 (1995). 
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Two enormous threshold obstacles beset BAM as a facial challenger in this case. 
First, in 1992 the United States Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 
112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) set forth the standard to be applied to a facial constitutionality 
challenge to a municipal ordinance. It held that," [a] statute regulating the uses that can be 
made of property effects a taking if it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land." 
'. "Id. at 2894 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although BAM claims that the County 
ordinance in question is facially unconstitutional, it does not - nor can it - make claim that 
it has been deprived of all economically viable use of its property. On the contrary, BAM 
was able to make full use of 44 of its originally planned 46 lots13, and was able to proceed 
with its subdivision, which it "essentially completed.14" 
In Smith Investment, supra, plaintiff-developer purchased a parcel zoned for 
commercial construction. After building a shopping center on the portion of the parcel, the 
13Appellant's Brief, p. 6,11. 4-5. This means that relinquishing the two lots, BAM 
lost less than 5% of the value of its property (2 out of 46 lots is approximately 4.35%). 
By comparison, the Smith Investment landowner lost "about 43%" of its land value 
{Smith, supra, 958 P.2d at 259) yet that was not enough to convince the court that a taking 
had occurred. In fact, the court here points out that "regulations causing much greater 
diminution in value than that found here have been upheld against takings challenges." 
(citing, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 47 S.Ct. 114, 117, 
71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 
394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915) (92.5% diminution); Pace Resources, Inc. v. 
Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir.1987) (89.5%); William C. Haas & 
Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.1979) (95%); Sierra Terreno 
v. Tahoe Regfl Planning Agency, 79 Cal.App.3d 439, 144 Cal.Rptr. 776, 777 (1978) 
(81%). Id.. 
14/rf.,p.6. 
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plaintiff reserved the rear 15.8 acre portion of the parcel for future use. In the meantime, 
Sandy city "downzoned" the reserved (rear) portion to residential use only. The plaintiff 
brought a facial challenge against the City, asserting substantive due process and takings 
claims, alleging - like BAM here - that the ordinance amendment was "economically 
'unduly oppressive.5" Id., 958 P.2d at 255 (record citation omitted) . But this court 
responded by holding that 
"...even when land value 'is substantially diminished as a result of zoning, that 
fact alone will not be deemed a sufficient ground for finding the regulation 
arbitrary and capricious. Such losses generally are deemed to be simply the 
uncompensated burdens one must accept to live in an ordered society." 
Id., 958 P.2d at 255-256. The Smith Investment court continued, "[w]here the zoning 
ordinance appears to the court to be a generally sensible one, even a serious reduction in 
value may not be sufficient to persuade the court that the ordinance is arbitrary and 
unreasonable." Id., 958 P.2d at 256. 
Here, BAM has not even attempted to demonstrate that it was deprived of all 
"economically viable" use of its parcel. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to 
BAM, it only shows that BAM lost - at most - 2 out of 46 building lots. The other 44 lots 
were fully developed as planned. The alleged loss of two building lots is questionably 
sufficient to even qualify as a "substantial" diminution in value, and even at that, under Smith 
Investment, would not begin to undermine the authority of the County to regulate highway-
width dedications. 
Second, BAM offered no evidence at trial, and does not even argue on appeal, that 
PAGE 26 OF 43 
(a) the County lacked a "legitimate governmental interest" in transportation corridor 
planning15, or (b) that the highway dedication ordinance is not "reasonably related" to such 
an interest. See, Smith Investment at 958 P.2d 252. As a facial takings challenger, BAM 
must carry the burden of showing that the ordinance "does not advance legitimate state 
interests." See, Smith Investment, 958 P.2d at fn. 18; see also, Dolan v. City ofTigard, supra, 
512 U.S. at 385,114 S.Ct. at 2316 (1994). But this proposition BAM has not even attempted 
to establish. Accordingly, BAM did not and cannot meet its burden under a facial challenge 
to the County's highway-dedication ordinance. 
All four cases cited by BAM are readily distinguishable from the instant case in that 
they concern exactions mandated in response to individual impact characteristics which were 
unique to the developments in each case. In this case, however, the County highway-
dedication requirement operates independently of any unique characteristics or proposed uses 
of specific parcels to which it applies. As with any land subdivider who chooses to develop 
a parcel which abuts a highway, BAM was required here simply to comply with a uniform 
legislative scheme which expects similarly situated land subdividers16 to dedicate highway 
rights-of-way consistent with current uniform road-width standards. 
Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to ensuring that community development 
15In fact, BAM concedes that the County has a valid interest in this respect. 
Appellant's Brief (Court of Appeals), p. 8. 
16
"Similarly situated" developers are those who, like BAM, develop property 
which abuts a major or secondary highway. See County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 
15.28.010 
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occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation planning. Otherwise, under 
BAM's view of constitutional law, road-width requirements for new construction along 
major traffic corridors would vary radically from parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size, 
usage, and other impact characteristics of each individual parcel. In practical effect, the BAM 
doctrine would require a different road-width dedication for every single parcel located along 
the side of a highway. Rather than having roadway segments with even and consistent 
widths, road edges and shoulders would be required to jut in and out in front of each abutting 
parcel, as dictated by an "individualized determination" of each parcel's impact. The absurd 
and nightmarish practical consequences of this notion are obvious. 
However, while BAM correctly perceives the County's highway-dedication ordinance 
as a generalized "location-based" exaction, as opposed to an individualized"impact-based" 
exaction like those in the cases upon which BAM relies, it still insists that the County's 
ordinance must pass muster under the "individualized" Dolan approach. 
This distinction is critical to determining the proper analysis for constitutional review. 
In the recent California Supreme Court case of San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of 
San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87,27 Cal.4th 643,117 Cal. Rptr.2d (Cal. 2002), this very distinction 
was discussed at length, and specifically in the context of the Dolan "proportionality" 
analysis. There, the plaintiff-hotel owner sought a city permit to convert a long-term rental 
housing facility into a short-term tourist rental facility. The city imposed a "housing 
replacement" exaction which required plaintiff- and all other residential hotel conversion 
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applicants - to provide replacement comparable residential housing units or pay an in lieu 
fee to a city-administered fund. Id., 41 P.3d at 92. The court distinguished the replacement-
housing exaction from an "ad hoc" individualized recreation fee imposed by a municipality 
on condominium developer which it previously invalidated17. The San Remo court noted 
that in its earlier case, the city had 
"relied on no specific legislative mandate to impose the fee condition and no 
legislatively set formula to calculate its size [;] the [fee] condition was 
imposed ad hoc, entirely at the discretion of the city council and staff." 
Id.,4l P.3dat 104 (citing Ehrlich, supra, 911 P.2d at 434-435). By contrast, San Francisco's 
housing-replacement exaction in San Remo, which the court ultimately upheld, was a 
"'generally applicable development fee or assessment *** imposed not 'individually5 but 
'pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability.'" Id., 41 P.3d at 105 (emphasis in 
original). The court added that, "[t]he 'sine qua nort for application of Nollan/Dolan 
scrutiny is thus the 'discretionary deployment of the police power' in 'the imposition of land-
use conditions in individual cases" {id., 41 P.3d at 105 (citation omitted)), reasoning that 
"[w]hile legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper leveraging [by a 
municipality], such generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary restraints of the 
democratic political process18." Id.. Thus the court upheld the housing-replacement scheme, 
11
 See, Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 12 Cal.4th 854 (Cal. 1996). 
18Similarly, in the present case, BAM's remedy for what it perceives as unfair 
County subdivision development conditions (if any remedy is appropriate) is a legislative 
remedy, not a judicial one. 
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affording a "deferential" level of scrutiny to the city's "generally legislated" exaction 
scheme. 
Here, the County's highway-dedication ordinance is just such a generally-applicable 
legislative scheme, uniformly imposing a regulatory standard for road-width dedication by 
subdivision developers. These standards are designed to ensure that new subdivisions which 
abut major or secondary highways will conform to current highway width and design 
standards as part of a regional transportation plan designed to accommodate future 
community growth and traffic demands. 
Consequently, the highway-dedication requirement necessarily affects only those 
developers whose property abuts a major or secondary highway19. The ordinance utilizes 
a legislatively adopted "formula" that standardizes road-width dedication based upon the 
size, location, type, and traffic volume of each highway in the county. The exaction in this 
case then, is not an "ad hoc" discretionary assessment imposed on an individualizedbasis at 
the whim of some bureaucrat, or based on unique impact factors attributable exclusively to 
BAM's particular development. Rather, as the trial court concluded, the County highway-
dedication ordinance 
"imposes the requirement of dedication on a broad class of property owners 
who choose to develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway 
[and] the assessment of how much property had to dedicated was not 
individualized, but rather was made pursuant to the generally applicable 
County Transportation Master Plan and applied across the board to all owners 
whose property abutted 3500 South." 
19County Code of Ordinances, 15.28.010 
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Memorandum Decision, p. 3 [R. 249]. As such, it should be accorded deferential scrutiny 
on review and upheld so long as it "advances a legitimate governmental interests." 
Courts have long struggled with drawing a distinction between a valid, police power-
based regulatory action and a compensable "taking." The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly 
admitted that it has "'... been unable to develop any 'set formula5 for determining when 
'justice and fairness5 require that economic injuries caused by public action5 must be deemed 
a compensable taking." KaiserAetnav. United States, 444 U.S. 164,175,110 S.Ct. 383,390 
(1979), quoting Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124,98 S.Ct. 2646, 
2659 (1978). Three factors prescribed by the Court to guide the takings analysis include (a) 
the character of the governmental action; (b) its economic impact; and (c) its interference 
with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 SCt 
2862, 2874, 81 LEd 815 (1984). 
In a case analogous to the instant case, involving a imposition of drainage 
improvement costs upon a railroad, the North Dakota Supreme Court employed the Monsanto 
analysis in Southeast Cass Water Resource District v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 527 
N.W. 884 (N.Dakota 1995). There the court upheld a statute which permitted water districts 
to impose costs for changing railway bridges and culverts to accommodate drainage as a 
valid police-power regulation, and not a taking, even though it created substantial expense 
to the railroad. The court noted that in Monsanto, the Supreme Court found that the chemical 
maker "... could not successfully challenge 'the ability of the Federal Government to regulate 
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the marketing and use of pesticides,' because 'such [police-power] restrictions are the 
burdens we all must bear in exchange for the 'advantage of living and doing business in a 
civilized community.'" Id., 527 N.W.2d at 895, quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007. The 
North Dakota court also distinguished Nollan and Dolan. It quoted Dolan for the proposition 
that "... [a] land use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] 
legitimate state interest' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land." 
527 N.W.2d at 896, quoting Dolan, 114 SCt at 2316 (citations omitted). The North Dakota 
court concluded that "...BN Railroad's duty in this case arises not from a municipal 
'adjudicative decision to condition,' but rather from an express and general legislated duty 
under a constitutional reservation of police power over a corporation." 527 NW2d at 896. 
Similarly, the ordinance at issue here is not a "adjudicative" action peculiar to BAM's 
property creating unique development conditions, but rather, it is a "generally legislated 
duty" the creation of which was expressly authorized by the Utah Legislature. 
Accordingly, the County maintains that in a challenge to a legislatively adopted land-
use regulation generally affecting similarly situated {e.g., highway-abutting) landowners, the 
proper constitutional inquiry is whether or not BAM has met its burden of demonstrating 
either that (a) the ordinance fails to advance a legitimate governmental interest, or (b) that 
is deprived BAM of all economically viable use of its land. Finally, BAM cannot possibly 
claim (and hasn't claimed) that the County's ordinance thwarted its "reasonable, investment-
backed expectations" since BAM purchased the parcel with full knowledge of the ordinance. 
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Inasmuch as BAM has not argued, or attempted to prove, either such proposition, the trial 
court's decision upholding the ordinance and dismissing BAM's takings claims should be 
affirmed. 
BAM's self-portrayal in this case as a victim of abusive or "insensitive"20 local 
government exactions is disingenuous. As an experienced subdivision developer, BAM was 
well aware that subdivision approvals are universally conditioned on dedication of road-
width ROWs where a subdivision parcel abuts a highway. According to the trial testimony 
of BAM's president, Scott McCleary, he had been a developer for 20 years and had built 
some 2000 homes in the Wasatch Front area21. There are obvious compensatory economic 
benefits for a subdivision developer in owning a parcel which abuts a major highway, which 
a nearby subdivider whose land is more remote from the highway do not enjoy (e.g., ease of 
public access from the adjacent thoroughfare; visibility and exposure of location to the public 
as a marketing edge; relatively short and direct access to highway-routed utilities such as 
water and sewer main lines, which reduce a developer's costs for acquisition of easements, 
installation of extended underground lines, etc.). As the trial court observed22, these are all 
factors which a developer considers in determining the economic viability of a prospective 
subdivision project. But in the real world, such commercial advantages also have a cost; in 
'Appellant's Brief (Court of Appeals) pp. 32, 33. 
R. 353 (internal p. 77,11. 5-18). 
Memorandum Decision, p. 4 [R. 250] 
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this case, the cost is the highway-dedication requirement. Apparently, BAM expected to 
enjoy the economic benefits of the convenient, accessible and conspicuous location of its 
subdivision, without incurring any of the attendant costs. 
(C) Separating Nollan from Dolan: An "Essential Nexus" does not Necessarily 
Require "Rough Proportionality" 
The County acknowledges that the Nollan "essential nexus" test is a valid requirement 
for constitutional analysis of a development exaction23. Even in its lengthy and vociferous 
dissenting opinion, the Court of Appeals found that the County's highway dedication 
ordinance passed the "essential nexus" test24. But the dissent then would have found that 
the County failed the Dolan "rough proportionality" test. While the Nollan and Dolan tests 
seem often to be inextricably connected in much of the current takings dialog25, the County 
maintains that the two tests are, indeed, two discrete analytical models, and can be readily 
separated. Thus, while an essential nexus should exist between a governmental interest and 
the nature of the development exaction which a political subdivision seeks to impose, it does 
not necessarily follow that the individualized "rough proportionality" requirement of Dolan 
must apply. 
23While the Nollan court devised the phrase "essential nexus" to distinguish its 
takings analysis from the "rational relationship"test evolved in its line of equal protection 
decisions, the phrases are functionally indistinguishable. 
24
 BAM Development, LLC v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 729-730,2004 UT 
App34ffl58-62. 
25Thus, although the Nollan/Dolan analysis is frequently referred to in cases as a 
singular "test," it actually involves two very different criteria. 
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The County suggests that where a "legislative" exaction plan (i.e., one of general 
application to all similarly situated property owners) receives scrutiny, the sole test should 
be the Nollan "essential nexus" test. Hence, once it is found that such a governmental 
entity's legislative scheme bears an essential nexus to its own legitimate governmental 
objectives, the consitutional inquiry should then end. It is only where the entity has imposed 
an individualized "adjudicative" decision tailored to the unique characteristics of an owner's 
property that the Dolan "rough proportionality" test should come into operation. 
2 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the district court's review is 
generally limited to the administrative record pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann., Sec. 17-27-1001. 
The Court of Appeals' decision effectively remands this litigation to the County 
administrative process to conduct a formal evidentiary hearing on BAM's administrative 
appeal, and to create a record thereof. The County maintains that the Court of Appeals erred 
only in holding that the "rough proportionality" test of the Dolan decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court should guide the County's administrative review and recordmaking, and any 
subsequent appellate review. The Court of Appeals' majority analysis of Sec. 17-27-1001 
as requiring a municipality to conduct appropriate hearing and recordmaking in appeals of 
most land use decisions is a sensible application of the statute and well supported by the 
authorities therein cited. However, as discussed in Argument 3, infra, this holding only 
applies in appeals which are not asserted as a "constitutional takings issue" under Utah Code 
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Ann. Sec. 63-90a-l,e/. seq.. 
The Court of Appeals decision in no manner defeats or restricts the ability of a private 
property owner to seek judicial redress for what it considers excessive municipal exactions 
and subdivision development conditions. The decision below simply requires that a County 
must provide an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing to be conducted, and a record 
thereof to be created. In accordance with Sec. 27-17-1001 and, by analogy to Sec. 17-27-
708, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the district court's review is limited to a review of 
the official administrative records generated before the appropriate county hearing officer 
or panel. This interpretation of Sec. 1001 is sensible and consonant with the legitimate 
legislative goals of reducing the delays and expenses of traditional litigation, redundant or 
inconsistent adjudicative proceedings, and providing parties with the efficiencies of an 
administrative tribunal. The requirement of a prejudicial administrative hearing and record 
also provides a mechanism for a municipality to review the rationale of its own agency 
decisions where contested by an affected citizen. Thus, the "administrative hearing and 
recordmaking" requirement read into Sec. 1001 by the Court of Appeals promote sound 
public policy and judicial economy. 
BAM incorrectly reasons that the Court of Appeals "improperly relies upon the phrase 
'land use decision5 as contained in Section 17-27-100l(3)(a) [because] [t]his is not a 'land 
use' case." BAM Petition for certiorari at 17. BAM then argues that the "land use" appeal 
provisions of Sec. 1001 apply only to "zoning or re-zoning cases," but not, as here, to a 
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subdivision "development approval case" Id.. BAM's legal basis for this distinction is far 
from clear. 
In reality, the phrase "land use planning" broadly encompasses "activities such as 
zoning, control of real estate development and use, environmental impact studies and the 
like."26 The statute itself (i.e., Sec. 17-27-1001) does not limit land use appeals solely to 
zoning decisions, as BAM would have it. On the contrary, Sec. 17-27-1001 (2)(a) provides 
that "[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of or in violation 
of this chapter may file a petition for review... ." (Emphasis added). The phrase "this 
chapter" refers to Chapter 27, which includes Sec. 17-27-801, et. seq, entitled 
"Subdivisions." The latter section of Chapter 27 grants counties the very authority under 
which subdivision approval, such as that given by Salt Lake County to BAM Development, 
may be conditioned and granted. In short, any form of real estate development regulation, 
including subdivision approval (and all conditions required for such approval) is a form of 
land-use control which comes under the umbrella of Sec. 17-27-1001 as a "land use decision" 
subject to the appeals provisions contained therein. Hence, BAM's argument, based on a 
tortured and overly restrictive definition of the phrase "land use decision," lacks merit. 
In short, then, the Court of Appeals' limitation of district court review to the 
administrative record is a sound interpretation of Sec. 17-27-1001 in cases generally which 
challenge a political subdivision's land use decision. However, as discussed below, Utah 
26Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 880 (emphasis added). 
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statute carves out a specific exception for those challenges asserted as "constitutional takings 
issues" under Sec. 63-90a-l, which apparently are entitled to special treatment. 
3 
Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits filing of an action on a 
"constitutional taking issue"regardless of the state of the administrative 
record. 
In granting limited certiorari review, the Supreme Court defined the third issue of this 
appeal as "[w]hether Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits review regardless of the 
state of the administrative record." Order of Utah Supreme Court, August 5, 2004. 
Section 63-90a-4 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Each political subdivision shall enact an ordinance that: 
(A) establishes a procedure for review of actions that may have 
constitutional takings issues; and 
(B) meets the requirements of this section. 
(2) (a) (i) Any owner of private property whose interest in the 
property is subject to a physical taking or exaction by a 
political subdivision may appeal the political 
subdivision's decision within 30 days after the decision 
is made. 
(b) The private property owner need not file the appeal authorized 
by this section before bringing an action in any court to 
adjudicate claims that are eligible for appeal. 
(c) A property owner's failure to appeal the action of a political 
subdivision does not constitute, and may not be interpreted as 
constituting, a failure to exhaust available administrative 
remedies or as a bar to bringing legal action. 
In seeking certiorari, BAM argued that the Court of Appeals "overlooked" Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 63-90a-4, entitled "Constitutional Taking Issues,"which, BAM claims, conflicts 
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with - and controls over - the Court of Appeal's interpretation of Sec. 17-27-1001 as 
requiring an administrative hearing and record making by the relevant municipality. BAM 
Petition for Certiorari at 15. 
The County objects to Supreme Court consideration of this issue on the ground that 
the issue was Sec. 63-90a-4 was not properly preserved below. BAM never raised Sec. 63-
90a-4 as an issue below, either before the trial court or before the Court of Appeals27. It is 
axiomatic that "[ijssues not raised in the court of appeals may not be raised on certiorari 
unless the issue arose for the first time out of the court of appeals decision." DeBry v. Noble, 
889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). Clearly, this new issue did not "arise for the first time out 
of the court of appeals' decision," inasmuch as it was never briefed or argued to the Court 
of Appeals. Thus, BAM should be precluded from raising the issue of Sec. 63-90a-4 at this 
juncture. 
However, if considered on the merits, it appears that Sec. 63-90a-4 is applicable in the 
context of this case. That statute, entitled "Constitutional Taking Issues," provides that 
political subdivisions are required to adopt the type of administrative review of constitutional 
takings claims contemplated by the County's "takings relief ordinance discussed above. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-90a-3. The County's takings relief procedure conforms to this 
27Interestingly, BAM cited, without discussion, to Sec. 63-90a-l, et seq. in the 
"Determinative Law" section of its Docketing Statement (#.v., filed October 18, 2001, at 
p. 11), but never briefed the issue it for which it sought certiorari in either its opening 
brief or its reply brief filed in the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the statute was not 
addressed in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
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requirements by providing a method by which an aggrieved citizen may seek review of a 
constitutional takings claim. Other avenues of administrative review are available for land 
use decisions which may or may not involve claims of unconstitutional takings28. 
Sec. 63-90a-4 allows to a citizen to seek judicial relief while bypassing the political 
subdivision's administrative takings relief review provided as an option by the statute. A 
plain reading of the statute29 suggests that where a private property owner chooses to 
denominate his or her objection to an action of a political subdivision as a "constitutional 
taking issue," the claim may bypass the local administrative process and be filed directly in 
district court. Accordingly, subject to the preservation objection discussed above, the County 
concedes that inasmuch as BAM's claim was asserted as a "constitutional taking issue," it 
was properly heard and decided in the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
By its own assertion, BAM's challenge to the County's highway-roadwidth dedication 
exaction is "facial." However, BAM has not met the heightened standard applied to a facial 
challenge to a municipal land use ordinance. It has not shown (or argued) either that the 
County's ordinance does not advance a legitimate governmental interest, or that the 
ordinance deprived BAM of all economically viable use of its land. 
28For instance, zoning decisions and variance applications are routinely appealed to 
the County's Board of Adjustment pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sec. 17-27-703, 704 and 
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances §19.92.030 A. 
29Which apparently has not been interpreted by any Utah appellate decision. 
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Secondly, no unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just compensation 
occurred in this case. As the trial court concluded, the heightened scrutiny "takings" 
requiring and "individualized determination" of "rough proportionality" analysis applied in 
the Supreme Court's Dolan case is not applicable in this case. The Dolan "rough 
proportionality" standard does not apply to a generally-applied legislative land-use scheme, 
as occurred here. The County ordinance at issue here applied equally and even-handedly to 
all highway-abutting land subdividers, and was not the product of an "ad hoc" individualized 
discretionary (i.e., "adjudicative") act. Therefore, while the ordinance should - and does -
satisfy the "essential nexus" test of Nollan, it is not subject to the Dolan "rough 
proportionality" test at all. Rather, the party challenging the ordinance must show that the 
ordinance lacks an "essential nexus" (i.e., it is not reasonably related to a legitimate 
governmental interest), which BAM has not even attempted to do in this case . 
Third, Utah's statutory scheme for county regulation of subdivision development 
expressly permits the requirement of highway dedication as a condition to subdivision 
approval. The County's subdivision and highway dedication ordinances are a valid police 
power land-use regulation entitled to "deferential" judicial scrutiny, not a constitutional 
"taking" of private property. 
Finally, although the Court of Appeals properly interpreted Sec. 17-27-1001 as 
limiting district court review of a land use decision appeal to the administrative record, this 
limitation does not apply to appeals involving a "constitutional takings issue," as this case 
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does, pursuant to the language of Sec. 63-90a-4. Therefore, this action was properly brought 
and tried in the district. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2004. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
DONJCETTH. HANSEN 
Deputy District Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND 
CROSS-RESPONDENT SALT LAKE COUNTY was mailed by U.S. First Class Mail, 
postage prepaid (2 copies) to: 
Stephen G. Homer, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan UT 84088 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
On this "}S day of Q d p W , 200A_. 
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BAM Development v. Salt Lake County, 
87P.3d710(2004) 
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2004 UT App 34 
B.AJVL DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah body pol-
itic and political subdivision of the State 
of Utah, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20010840-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 20, 2004. 
Rehearing Denied April 8, 2004. 
Background: Developer sought license to 
develop subdivision, and county zoning and 
planning commission granted preliminary 
approval after developer agreed to dedicat-
ed certain portion of the property for fu-
ture road widening. Subsequently, howev-
er, board requested additional dedication 
of land, and, upon developer's objection to 
increase, denied its license application 
without receiving any evidence. Developer 
appealed to board of commissioners, claim-
ing request for additional dedication 
amounted to unconstitutional taking, and 
board of commissioners, without taking ev-
idence, upheld denial of license. Developer 
appealed. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., 
found in favor of county. Developer appeal-
ed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, 
J., held that it was reversible error for 
trial court to receive evidence. 
Reversed and remanded with directions. 
Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Statutes ®=>188, 212.6 
In context of statutory interpretation, 
courts presume that the legislature used each 
word advisedly and courts give effect to the 
term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning. 
2. Zoning and Planning <2>745.1 
Court of Appeals reviews county's land 
use decision as if the appeal has come direct-
ly from the agency, rather than from district 
court; thus, the standard for Court of Ap-
peals' review is the same standard estab-
lished for district court's review. U.C.A. 
1953, 17-27-1001. 
3. Zoning and Planning <S»744, 745.1, 747 
On appeal from district court's review of 
county's land use decision, Court of Appeals' 
review is limited to the record provided by 
the county board of commissioners; Court of 
Appeals may not accept or consider any evi-
dence outside the board's record and cannot 
weigh evidence anew, rather, Court of Ap-
peals must simply determine, in light of the 
evidence before the board, whether a reason-
able mind could reach the same conclusion as 
the board. U.C.A.1953,17-27-1001. 
4. Eminent Domain <3=*307(2) 
Historically, takings determinations are 
mixed questions of law and fact. 
5. Zoning and Planning <3=»641, 748 
It was reversible error for trial court, on 
review of land use decision of county board of 
commissioners confirming denial of develop-
er's application for license to develop subdivi-
sion, which decision was reached without 
board receiving any evidence, to receive evi-
dence regarding developer's claim that predi-
cate for denial, county's requirement that 
developer dedicate additional land for pro-
spective street widening, amounted to uncon-
stitutional taking; court lacked statutory au-
thorization to receive evidence, and it could 
only determine whether board acted arbi-
trarily or capriciously, given the lack of rec-
ord. U.C.A.1953, 17-27-1001(3)(a). 
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for Ap-
pellant. 
Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake County At-
torney's Office, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 




HI B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. (BAM), 
appeals from a district court decision finding 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT v. SALT LAKE COUNTY Utah 711 
Cite as 87 P.3d 710 (UtahApp. 2004) 
that no unconstitutional taking occurred 
when Salt Lake County (the County) re-
quired BAM to dedicate additional land as a 
condition of subdivision approval. We re-
verse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
112 In 1997, BAM sought to develop a 
subdivision located at 7755 West 3500 South 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. The Salt Lake 
County Planning and Zoning Commission 
(the Commission) granted preliminary ap-
proval for the proposed subdivision. In the 
original subdivision plat, BAM agreed to ded-
icate a forty-foot strip of land in anticipation 
of 3500 South being widened. In April 1998, 
the County informed BAM that after consult-
ing with the Utah Department of Transpor-
tation (UDOT), the County had determined 
that BAM must dedicate an additional thir-
teen-foot strip of land abutting 3500 South in 
anticipation of future road expansion. BAM 
objected to the increase because it had al-
ready drafted and divided the subdivision 
plots utilizing the forty-foot dedication.1 
BAM argued that increasing the dedication 
to fifty-three feet would alter several plots 
dramatically and would require reconfigura-
tion of the subdivision at great expense. 
Without receiving any evidence, the Commis-
sion denied BAM's license to develop their 
subdivision without the fifty-three-foot dedi-
cation. 
113 BAM appealed to the Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners (the Board), by fil-
ing a "Notice of Claim" with the Board. In 
this Notice of Claim, BAM claimed that 
"[t]he uncompensated dedication and im-
provement of the additional roadway consti-
tute^] an unconstitutional 'taking,' not rea-
sonably justified by the actual impact created 
by the proposed development." Without 
conducting a hearing, taking evidence, or is-
1. Below, BAM argued that "[t]he uncompensated 
dedication and improvement of the additional 
roadway constitutes an unconstitutional 'taking,' 
not reasonably justified by the actual impact cre-
ated by the proposed development." (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, BAM did not challenge the dedi-
cation of the first forty feet of land and has 
waived review of that portion of the dedication. 
2. BAM also argued that the County violated 
Utah's constitutional protections of Equal Protec-
suing findings, the Board upheld the Com-
mission's decision. 
114 BAM then filed suit in district court 
claiming that the County's demand was un-
constitutional because it was not roughly pro-
portional, as required by Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 
2319-20, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). After trial, 
the district court found in favor of the Coun-
ty, concluding that the rough proportionality 
test did not apply. BAM objected to the 
district court's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and filed a motion for a new 
trial. The district court overruled BAM's 
objections and denied its motion for a new 
trial. BAM appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
11 5 BAM argues that the County's dedica-
tion requirement of thirteen additional feet 
constitutes a taking of its land without just 
compensation, in violation of the United 
States Constitution.2 However, we must 
first determine whether the district court 
acted properly when it received evidence and 
then ruled on the constitutionality of the 
land-dedication requirement. Resolution of 
this issue requires statutory interpretation, 
which we review for correctness. See Valley 
Colour Inc. v. Beuchert Builders Inc., 944 
P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1997) (noting that " *[i]n 
matters of pure statutory interpretation, an 
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling 
for correctness and gives no deference to its 
legal conclusions' " (citations omitted)). 
ANALYSIS 
116 The County Land Use Development 
and Management Act, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-101 to -1003 (2001), authorizes coun-
ties "to enact all ordinances, resolutions, and 
tion and Uniform Operation of Laws. However, 
because we find that the district court misinter-
preted Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001 
(2001) and received evidence in this case when it 
should have found the Board's treatment of 
BAM's takings claim to be arbitrary and capri-
cious, and we remand on that basis, we need not 
address the takings question or the other issues 
raised by BAM. 
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rules that they consider necessary for the 
use and development of land within the coun-
ty unless expressly prohibited by 
law." Id. § 17-27-102(l).3 If a landowner 
disagrees with a county land use decision, 
that landowner can appeal the decision, pur-
suant to Utah Code Annotated section 17-
27-1001. Section 17-27-1001 (3)(a) provides 
that when a county's land use decision is 
appealed to the district court, that court shall 
"presume that land use decisions and regula-
tions are valid; and determine only 
whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal" Id (emphasis add-
ed).4 "A determination of illegality requires 
3. We cite to the most recent version of the statute 
for convenience However, all amendments rele-
vant to this opinion will be noted 
4. Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001 pro-
vides, in relevant part 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a 
county's land use decisions made under this 
chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person 
has exhausted all administrative remedies 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any 
decision made m the exercise of the provi-
sions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court 
within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered 
(3) (a) The courts shall 
(I) presume that land use decisions and 
regulations are valid, and 
(n) determine only whether or not the de-
cision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal 
(b) A determination of illegality requires a 
determination that the decision violates a 
statute, ordinance, or existing law 
Utah Code Ann § 17-27-1001(1), (2)(a),-(3)(a)(b) 
(2001) 
5. Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-708 pro-
vides, in relevant part 
(1) Any person adversely affected by any deci-
sion of a board of adjustment may petition the 
district court for a review of the decision 
(2)(a) The district court's review is limited to a 
determination of whether the board of adjust-
ment's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or ille-
gal 
(b) A determination of illegality requires a 
determination that the board of adjustment's 
decision violates a statute, ordinance, or ex 
isting law 
(4)(a) The board of adjustment shall transmit 
to the reviewing court the record of its pro-
ceedings including its minutes, findings, orders 
a determination that the decision violates a 
statute, ordinance, or existing law." Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (3)(b). 
[1] 11 7 While no Utah Court has specifi-
cally addressed the standard of review appli-
cable to appeals brought pursuant to section 
17-27-1001, we have addressed the standard 
of review for appeals taken pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated section 17-27-708 (2001), 
which contains language similar to that of 
section 17-27-1001.5 Compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-708, with id. § 17-27-1001. 
In the absence of any case law interpreting 
section 17-27-1001, we, by analogy, rely upon 
case law interpreting section 17-27-708.6 
and, if available, a true and correct transcript 
of its proceedings 
(5)(a) 
(I) If there is a record, the district court's 
review is limited to the record provided by the 
board of adjustment 
(n) The court may not accept or consider any 
evidence outside the board of adjustment's 
record unless that evidence was offered to the 
board of adjustment and the court determines 
that it was improperly excluded by the board 
of adjustment 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call 
witnesses and take evidence 
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the 
board of adjustment if the decision is sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record 
Utah Code Ann § 17-27-708, (1), (2)(a), (4)(a) 
(5)(a), (5)(b), (6) (2001) (emphasis added) 
6. We acknowledge that the analogy to section 
17-27-708 is not perfect For example, section 
17-27-708(5)(b) authorizes the district court to 
call witnesses and receive evidence if no record 
was made below, see id § 17-27-708(5)(b), or if 
on review the district court determines that the 
Commission erroneously excluded evidence See 
id § 17-27-708(5)(a)(n) In contrast, section 
17-27-1001 does not authorize the district court 
to receive evidence or call witnesses However, 
this distinction merely strengthens our position 
that the district court erred in receiving evi-
dence In the case of section 17-27-1001, the 
legislature did not authorize the district court to 
receive evidence even though it had done so in 
other situations See Utah Code Ann § 17-27-
708(5)(b) "[W]e ' "presume that the legislature 
used each word advisedly and [we] give effect to 
the term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning " ' " Department of Natural Res v 
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co, 2002 UT 
75,1113, 52 P3d 1257 (citations omitted) Ac-
cordingly, we conclude that section 17-27-1001 
does not authorize the district court to receive 
evidence Instead, the district court can only 
review the record made before the County 
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[2,3] 118 In Patterson v. Utah County 
Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. 
App.1995), landowners sought a "special ex-
ception under a county zoning ordinance." 
Id. at 603. The county conducted a heanng, 
received evidence, and then granted the ex-
ception. See id. Pursuant to section 17-27-
708, another landowner appealed the decision 
to the district court, where the county's ac-
tions were found to be "arbitrary, capricious, 
and illegal." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603. 
The matter was then appealed to this court. 
See id. On appeal, the parties attempted to 
introduce new evidence. See id at 610-11. 
We concluded, because the board of adjust-
ments had conducted a hearing and received 
evidence, that we were limited to the existing 
record. See id. at 604. In reaching this 
conclusion, we stated: 
Since the district court's review of the 
Board's decision was limited to a review of 
the Board's record, we do not accord any 
particular deference to the district court's 
decision. Instead, we review the Board's 
Next, the dissent incorrectly claims that Sandy 
City v Salt Lake County, 827 P 2d 212 (Utah 
1992), prohibits our analogy to section 17-27-
708 In Sandy City, the Utah Supreme Court 
cautioned against the use of statutes relating to 
cities in county-land-use appeals See id at 220 
The court noted that " 'the respective statutes 
dealing with cities and counties confer different 
powers ' " Id (citations omitted) The court 
further noted, in a footnote, that in the earlier 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, we had 
erroneously relied on a municipal statute, had 
applied an incorrect standard of review, and had 
limited our review to the administrative record 
See id n 4 
In Sandy City, no statute governed appeals 
from county land-use decisions See id In con-
trast, here, section 17-27-1001 sets forth this 
court's standard of review-whether the county's 
action was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal " 
Utah Code Ann § 17-27-1001 (5)(b) Further-
more, in Sandy City, this court erroneously ap-
plied a municipal standard of review to a county 
land-use decision See Sandy City, 827 P 2d at 
220 n 4 Here, contrary to the dissent's claim, 
we do not substitute section 17-27-708 for sec-
tion 17-27-1001 Instead, we simply look to 
cases interpreting similar language to determine 
how the legislature intended courts to review 
county land use decisions 
Next, the dissent implies that we apply the 
standard of review set forth in section 17-27-
708, while ignoring section 17-27-1001 We do 
not substitute the standard of review in section 
17_27-708 for the one m section 17-27-1001 
Instead, because of an absence of clear guidance 
decision as if the appeal had come directly 
from the agency. Thus, the standard for 
our review of the Board's decision is the 
same standard established in the Utah 
Code for the district court's review. 
In determining whether substantial evi-
dence supports the Board's decision we 
will consider all the evidence in the record, 
both favorable and contrary to the Board's 
decision. Nevertheless, our review, like 
the distnct court's review, "is limited to 
the record provided by the board of adjust-
ment The court may not accept or 
consider any evidence outside the board['s] 
record " We must simply determine, in 
light of the evidence before the Board, 
whether a reasonable mind could reach the 
same conclusion as the Board. It is not 
our prerogative to weigh the evidence 
anew. 
Id at 603-04 (citations and footnotes omit-
ted.) 7 
by the legislature, we merely refer to section 17-
27-708 by analogy because both statutes limit the 
district court's review to whether the county's 
decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal " 
Compare Utah Code Ann § 17-27-708(2)(a), 
with id § 17-27-1001(3)(a) 
Finally, the dissent makes much of the "Coun-
ty's concession in its brief that 'BAM followed 
the appeal procedure outlined in the Utah Stat-
utes and corresponding Salt Lake County Ordi-
nance provisions] ' " We agree However, our 
focus is not on whether BAM followed the cor-
rect procedure, but whether the district court 
exceeded the scope of its authority pursuant to 
section 17-27-1001 when it received evidence in 
this case Any "concession" made by BAM has 
no bearing on the propriety of the district court's 
actions 
7. In Patterson v Utah County Bd of Adjustment, 
893 P 2d 602 (Utah Ct App 1995), we determined 
that appellate courts were bound by the record 
before the board of adjustments See id at 604 
However, Patterson did not address the import of 
section 17-27-708(5)(b), which allows the dis-
trict court to receive evidence if no record was 
made below See Utah Code Ann § 17-27-
708(5)(1) (2001) Still, Patterson provides some 
guidance regarding how we should review ap-
peals pursuant to section 17-27-1001, because it 
addresses a situation, like the one here, when the 
appellate court cannot receive evidence and can 
only determine, on the record before it, whether 
the administrative agency acted arbitrarily, ca-
priciously, or illegally See Patterson, 893 P 2d at 
604 
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H 9 Here, neither the Commission, nor the 
Board, received evidence on whether the 
County's requirement of an additional thir-
teen feet was a "taking " Instead, both ap-
proved the County's action without a hearing 
Consequently, the district court had no rec-
ord to review The lack of a record appar-
ently prompted the district court to receive 
evidence and determine for itself whether the 
County had unconstitutionally taken BAM's 
property However, the plain language of 
section 17-27-1001 does not authorize the 
district court to receive evidence See Utah 
Code Ann § 17-27-1002(3)(a)8 Thus, we 
conclude that the district court is limited to 
the record made before the County and can 
determine only whether the County's deci-
sion was "arbitrary, capncious, or illegal" 
Id. § 17-27-1001(3)(a)(n), see also Wilcox v 
CSX Corp, 2003 UT 21,118, 70 P3d 85 (not-
ing that courts first look to the plain lan-
guage of a statute and only look beyond the 
plain language if there is an ambiguity)9 
[4] 1110 The absence of a record in this 
case is highly problematic, because historical-
ly, takings determinations are mixed ques-
tions of law and fact See Lucas v South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 
1071, 112 SCt 2886, 2922, 120 LEd2d 798 
(1992) (Blackmun, J , dissenting) (noting that 
whether government action has depnved a 
claimant of his property without just com-
pensation is an "essentially [an] ad hoc, fac-
tual inquir[y]") Moreover, Utah courts also 
have acknowledged that evaluating the rea-
sonableness of an exaction is a fact-intensive 
inquiry 
1111 In Home Builders Ass n v City of 
American Fork, 1999 UT 7, 973 P 2d 425, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that "[exactions,] 
such [as] fees[,] are constitutionally permissi-
ble if the benefits derived from their exaction 
are 'of "demonstrable benefit" to the subdivi-
sion,' and if newly developed properties are 
8 The dissent argues that even if we were to 
apply section 17-27-708 to the instant appeal it 
would not change the result We do not advo 
cate the substitution of section 17-27-708 for 
section 17-27-1001 Instead we simply refer to 
case law interpreting section 17-27-708 to sup 
port our conclusion that the district court s role 
in this case is limited to determining whether the 
Board acted arbitrarily capriciously or illegally 
in summarily denying BAM s taking claim 
not required to bear more than their equita-
ble share of the capital costs in relation to 
the benefits conferred " Id at 1114 (quotmg 
Banberry Dev Corp v South Jordan City, 
631 P2d 899, 905 (Utah 1981) (additional 
citation omitted)) In assessing the reason-
ableness of an exaction, a fact finder may 
consider, among other factors 
(1) the cost of existing capital facilities, (2) 
the manner of financing existing capital 
facilities (such as user charges, special as-
sessments, bonded indebtedness, general 
taxes, or federal grants), (3) the relative 
extent to which the newly developed prop-
erties and the other properties m the mu-
nicipality have already contributed to the 
cost of existing capital facilities (by such 
means as user charges, special assess-
ments, or payment from the proceeds of 
general taxes), (4) the relative extent to 
which the newly developed properties and 
the other properties in the municipality 
will contnbute to the cost of existing capi-
tal facilities m the future, (5) the extent to 
which the newly developed properties are 
entitled to a credit because the municipali-
ty is requiring their developers or owners 
(by contractual arrangement or otherwise) 
to provide common facilities (inside or out-
side the proposed development) that have 
been provided by the municipality and fi-
nanced through general taxation or other 
means (apart from user charges) in other 
parts of the municipality, (6) extraordi-
nary costs, if any, in servicing the newly 
developed properties, and (7) the time-
price differential inherent in fair compari-
sons of amounts paid at different times 
Id at 115 (quoting Banberry, 631 P2d at 
903-04) This list, while not exhaustive, illus-
trates that the determination of whether an 
exaction is reasonable is a fact-intensive in-
quiry 
9 The dissent spends considerable time discuss 
mg the differences between board of adjustments 
and county commissions We acknowledge the 
distinction between these two bodies but note 
that review from both is limited to whether the 
decision was arbitrary capricious or illegal 
This similarity is the basis for our analogy to 
section 17-27-708 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT v. SALT LAKE COUNTY Utah 715 
Cite as 87 P.3d 710 (UtahApp. 2004) 
[5] 1112 Here, the absence of a record at 
the administrative level prevented the dis-
trict court from evaluating the propriety of 
the Board's action as directed by Utah Code 
Annotated section 17-27-1001(3)(a). We 
conclude that the district court erred when it 
received evidence on BAM's taking claim. 
The district court should have, instead, de-
termined that the Board, in the absence of an 
adequate factual record, acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in deciding BAM's takings claim. 
1113 Thus, we reverse the district court's 
decision and remand the case directing the 
district court to enter a judgment that the 
Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
when it failed to conduct a hearing on BAM's 
takings claim. The district court should then 
remand the case to the proper county agen-
cy, directing that agency to conduct a proper 
hearing on BAM's takings claim.10 
1114 However, because we anticipate that a 
county body will have to determine the con-
stitutionality of the exaction, we provide 
some guidance regarding the proper stan-
dard to apply. BAM argues that its proper-
ty has been taken without just compensation. 
The Takings Clause, which applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, declares: "[N]or shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. 
One of the Clause's primary purposes is 
"'to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.' " 
Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 
257 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quoting Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S.Ct. 
2309, 2316, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994)). One 
type of "taking" associated with subdivision 
approval is a "development exaction." 
10. Effective in 2000, Salt Lake County substan-
tially changed its governmental structure Prior 
to the change, the County was governed by three 
County Commissioners We remand this case 
directing the district court to order a hearing on 
BAM's takings claim However, in light of the 
change in county structure, remand to the Board 
of Commissioners is impossible Thus, the dis-
trict court must also determine which Salt Lake 
County governmental body should consider 
BAM's takings claim 
[Development exactions may be defined as 
contributions to a governmental entity im-
posed as a condition precedent to approv-
ing the developer's project. Usually, exac-
tions are imposed prior to the issuance of a 
building permit or zoning/subdivision ap-
proval. Development exactions may take 
the form of: (1) mandatory dedications of 
land for roads, schools or parks, as a condi-
tion to plat approval, (2) fees-in-lieu of 
mandatory dedication, (3) water or sewage 
connection fees, and (4) impact fees. 
Salt Lake County v. Board of Educ, 808 
P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (quotations and 
citations omitted); see also No. 13 Richard 
R. Powell, Powell on Real Property, 
§ 79D.04[2][a], 295-96, (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2003) (noting that "exactions" are gener-
ally sought through several methods: (1) 
land dedication requirements, (2) land dedi-
cation requirement with fee option, (3) im-
pact fees, or (4) in-kind exactions). In Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 
2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994) and Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 
107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), the 
United States Supreme Court developed a 
two-part test for determining whether a par-
ticular developmental exaction violated the 
takings clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 
H 15 In Dolan, the Court concluded that 
for a development exaction to be constitution-
al, the government must show an " 'essential 
nexus'... between the legitimate state inter-
est' " and the land dedication requirement. 
512 U.S. at 386, 114 S.Ct. at 2317 (citation 
omitted). The Court further explained that 
to succeed the government "must make some 
sort of individualized determination that the 
required dedication is related both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development." Id. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-
The dissent attacks this approach as "repug-
nant to the important principles of judicial econ-
omy " While we admit that in this case it might 
be quicker to ignore the appropriate standard of 
review and address the merits of this case, we 
would do so in direct opposition to the mandate 
of Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001 
The more appropriate approach is to balance the 
desire for judicial economy against the need for 
judicial restraint In this case, as in most cases, 
judicial restraint should, and does, prevail 
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20. The Court labeled this examination a 
"rough proportionality" test. Id. at 391, 114 
S.Ct. at 2319. 
1116 Here, BAM was required to dedicate 
thirteen additional feet of land that abutted 
3500 South before the County would approve 
its subdivision plat. We conclude that this 
constitutes a developmental exaction as de-
scribed in Nollan and Dolan. Accordingly, 
the Nollan/Dolan "rough proportionality" 
test applies in this case. Therefore, upon 
remand, the reviewing body must determine: 
(1) whether requiring the exaction serves a 
legitimate government interest, and (2) 
whether there is a " 'rough proportionality'" 
between the exaction and the "impact of the 
proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20; see also No. 13 
Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property, 
§ 79D.04[2][a], 295-96, (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2003).11 
CONCLUSION 
1117 We conclude that the district court 
exceeded its authority when it conducted a 
hearing and received evidence on BAM's tak-
ings claim contrary to the limits established 
in Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-
1001(3)(a). The distnct court should have 
concluded that the Board acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in deciding BAM's taking 
issue without conducting a hearing. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the district court's decision, 
and remand directing the district court to set 
aside the Board's determination. The dis-
trict court shall then identify the proper body 
to conduct a full hearing on the merits and 
remand the case to that body. 
1118 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Judge. 
11. In Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 U S 374, 114 
S.Ct. 2309, 129 LEd2d 304 (1994), the United 
States Supreme Court announced for the first 
time a "rough proportionality" test to apply 
when evaluating the constitutionality of exac-
tions. Id at 391, 114 S Ct. at 2319 In Dolan, 
the Court acknowledged that the majority of 
states have adopted a "reasonable relationship" 
test Id The Court concluded that the "reason-
able relationship" test was "close[ ] to the federal 
constitutional norm " Id However, the Court 
declined to adopt the phrase "reasonable rela-
tionship" because of its similarity to the phrase 
"rational basis " Id In all other respects, it 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
1119 With neither party having so argued, 
it is perplexing that the majority insists on 
analyzing the propriety of the trial court's 
actions under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708 
(2001), while at the same time admitting that 
this appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-1001 (2001). I disagree with this 
approach and the remedy of starting over 
before an entity of county government yet to 
be selected by the trial court. This result is 
especially disturbing given the County's con-
cession in its brief that "BAM followed the 
appeal procedure outlined in the Utah stat-
ute and corresponding Salt Lake County Or-
dinance provisions]." 
1120 Under both sections 17-27-708 and 
17-27-1001, judicial review "is limited to a 
determination of whether the [challenged] 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708(2)(a). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (3)(a)(ii). 
However, section 17-27-708 restricts the tri-
al court's authority to take evidence, while 
section 17-27-1001 does not. By its own 
terms, section 17-27-708 applies only to trial 
court review of "any decision of a board of 
adjustment." Id. § 17-27-708(1). BAM's 
appeal was not, of course, from a decision of 
a board of adjustment, but from a decision of 
the Salt Lake County Board of Commission-
ers. This distinction is significant, given the 
very limited purview of a board of adjust-
ment's powers and duties, which, at the time 
of BAM's appeal to the County Commission, 
was to "hear and decide . appeals from 
zoning decisions applying the zoning ordi-
nance^] special exceptions to the terms of 
the zoning ordinance^ and] variances from 
appears that the Court adopted a "reasonable 
relationship" test and simply renamed it the 
"rough proportionality" test. 
Utah has also applied the "reasonable relation-
ship" test when evaluating the constitutionality 
of an exaction See, e g , Home Builders Ass'n v. 
City of Am Fork, 1999 UT 7,1114-16, 973 P 2d 
425 (applying the "reasonable relationship" test 
to a real estate development fee), Banberry Dev 
Corp v South Jordan City, 631 P 2d 899, 905 
(Utah 1981) (applying the " 'reasonable relation-
ship' " test to a subdivision impact fee (citation 
omitted)) 
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the terms of the zoning ordinance." Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-703(l)(a)-(c) (1995) (em-
phasis added).1 The Salt Lake County zon-
ing ordinances, contained in Title 19 of the 
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, are 
not relevant to this appeal. Rather, this 
appeal contests the County's power to re-
quire highway dedication from abutting prop-
erty owners under Title 15 of the Salt Lake 
County Code of Ordinances. Understanding 
the difference in function between a board of 
adjustment and a county commission goes a 
long way in demonstrating that there is a 
rational basis for the distinction between sec-
tion 17-27-708, applicable only to judicial 
review of board of adjustment decisions, and 
section 17-27-1001, applicable to land use 
decisions generally. Such an understanding 
dispels any notion that the Legislature meant 
to include section 17-27-708's restriction in 
section 17-27-1001, but just forgot to say so, 
or that, on some other basis, the restriction 
should be grafted onto section 17-27-1001. 
1121 Boards of adjustment are adjudicative 
bodies—they take sworn testimony and com-
pel the attendance of witnesses, see id. § 17-
27-702(3); they keep records of their pro-
ceedings, see id. § 17-27-702(4)(b)(ii); and 
they may even choose to make their record 
with the same completeness as a district 
court, i.e., by means of a court reporter or 
tape recorder. See id. § 17-27-702(4)(c). In 
sharp contrast, county commissions are not, 
first and foremost, adjudicative bodies and 
thus are not positioned to generate the kind 
of record that a board of adjustment will. 
Thus, a restriction on judicial roving into the 
evidentiary realm in the case of a board of 
adjustment decision makes sense: There 
should already be an adequate record. How-
ever, in contrast, it makes no sense to pre-
1. The powers and duties of the board of adjust-
ment have since been expanded See Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-703(2001) 
2. Prior cases have distinguished boards of adjust-
ment from local legislative bodies, both at the 
county level, see Toone v Weber County, 2002 UT 
103,117, 57 P3d 1079 (recognizing that section 
17-27-707, for example, "grant[s] boards of ad-
justment limited power to grant zoning vari-
ances"); Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P 2d 331, 
333 (Utah 1980) (stating that "the County Com-
mission is charged with the responsibility for 
approving subdivision plats—not the Board of 
elude a court from taking evidence where a 
county commission has made the decision 
under attack because no equivalent record 
will ordinarily have been made by the county 
commission.2 Therefore, the general provi-
sion set forth in section 17-27-1001 controls, 
not the provision limited, by its own terms, to 
boards of adjustment. 
U 22 The majority argues that the language 
in section 17-27-708 "strengthens Lits] posi-
tion that the district court erred in receiving 
evidence" because section 17-27-1001 is si-
lent on the matter. Specifically, section 17-
27-708(5)(a)(ii)-(b) states: "The [trial] court 
may not accept or consider any evidence 
outside the board of adjustment's record un-
less that evidence was offered to the board of 
adjustment and the court determines that it 
was improperly excluded by the board of 
adjustment [or] there is no record." Id. 
(emphasis added). The logic of the majori-
ty's argument is flawed. Section 17-27-708 
restricts the trial court's authority to take 
evidence unless one of the two enumerated 
exceptions applies. Section 17-27-1001, 
however, contains no such restriction. With-
out the restriction, there is no hindrance to 
the trial court's receiving evidence. See Bid-
die v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 
110,1114, 993 P.2d 875 ("[0]missions in statu-
tory language should 'be taken note of and 
given effect.'") (quoting Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 
217, 219 (1973)). Indeed, if silence meant the 
trial court cannot consider evidence in the 
absence of express authorization, there would 
simply be no reason for the restriction ex-
pressed in section 17-27-708—it would al-
ready be the case that evidence could not 
ordinarily be received by the reviewing court. 
Adjustment") (emphasis in original), and at the 
municipal level See Bradley v Payson City 
Corp , 2003 UT 16,11 13, 70 P.3d 47 ("[A] board of 
adjustment is a quasi-judicial body designed only 
to correct specific zoning errors "), Harmon 
City, Inc v Draper City, 2000 UT App 31,1(16, 
997 P 2d 321 (noting that "[t]he distinction be-
tween quasi-judicial decisions of a board of ad-
justment as opposed to legislative municipal zon-
ing decisions is significant boards of adjustment 
have no legislative powers and are not permitted 
to have those powers") 
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1123 Significantly, this court has previously 
relied on a statute applicable to a board of 
adjustment decision in an appeal stemming 
from a planning commission decision, only to 
have our error corrected by the Utah Su-
preme Court. In Sandy City v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct.App.1990) 
(Sandy City I), rev'd, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 
1992) (Sandy City II), this court applied 
former section 10-9-15,3 the municipal ana-
logue to current section 17-27-708, to an 
appeal stemming from an action of the Salt 
Lake County Planning Commission. See 
Sandy City I, 794 P.2 at 486. In so doing, 
this court stated that its review was limited 
to the administrative record. See id. The 
Utah Supreme Court called attention to our 
error in Sandy City II, indicating that "the 
court of appeals [mistakenly] confined its 
review to the administrative record," be-
cause, "[f]irst, section 10-9-15 applies only to 
municipalities, not to counties[, and sjecond, 
section 10-9-15 applies only to relief sought 
from the actions of the board of adjustment, 
not from the actions of the planning commis-
sion or the board of county commissioners." 
827 P.2d at 220 n. 4. Interestingly, the Court 
also noted that, "[a]t the time [Sandy City I 
was decided], no analogous statute regulated 
legal grievances arising from the actions of 
Salt Lake County or the planning commis-
sion; consequently, there was no basis for 
the court of appeals to confine its review to 
the administrative record." Sandy City II, 
827 P.2d at 220 n. 4. 
1124 Contrary to the law in existence at the 
time Sandy City I was decided, we do now 
have a statute that controls appeals from 
land use decisions of the Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners—section 17-27-
3. That section provided, in relevant part, that 
"any person aggneved by any decision of the 
board of adjustment may have and maintain a 
plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of 
competent jurisdiction " Utah Code Ann § 10-
9-15(1986) 
4. It is curious, then, that the majority cites Pat-
terson v Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 
P.2d 602 (Utah Ct App 1995), in support of its 
proposition that the trial court erroneously re-
ceived evidence m the instant case As the ma-
jority recognizes, the board of adjustment in 
Patterson conducted a hearing and received evi-
dence. See id. at 603 Therefore, pursuant to 
section 17-27-708, a reviewing court could not 
1001. If it is improper to apply a statute 
applicable to actions of a board of adjustment 
even when there is no comparable statute 
governing appeals from another governmen-
tal body, it seems axiomatic that it would be 
improper to do so when there is such a 
statute. 
1125 But even if it were somehow proper 
to analyze the trial court's actions under 
section 17-27-708, it would not change the 
approach in the instant appeal. As the ma-
jority recognizes, a trial court may not "ac-
cept or consider any evidence outside the 
board of adjustment's record" under section 
17-27-708 unless: (1) there is no record, see 
id. § 17-27-708(5)(b), or (2) "evidence was 
offered to the board of adjustment and the 
court determines that it was improperly ex-
cluded." Id § 17-27-708(5)(a)(ii). Because 
there was no record made in connection with 
BAM's appeal to the Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners, the instant case fits 
squarely within the exception enumerated in 
section 17-27-708(b).4 Therefore, even if we 
do look to section 17-27-708 in analyzing the 
trial court's actions, as the majority urges, 
the court properly called witnesses and took 
evidence, which evidence is properly now 
part of our record. See Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984) 
(" The nature and extent of [judicial] review 
depends on what happened below as re-
flected by a true record of the proceedings' 
[before the board of adjustment. Thus], if 
the hearing had proceeded in accordance 
with due process requirements, the review-
ing court could look only to the record, but 
where it had not or where there was nothing 
to review, the reviewing court must be al-
receive additional evidence in that case unless it 
determined that such evidence "was improperly 
excluded by the board " Utah Code Ann § 17-
27-708(5)(a)(n) BAM's appeal, on the other 
hand, was summarily denied by the Salt Lake 
County Board of Commissioners, whose re-
sponse consisted entirely of the following state-
ment: "The Board of County Commissioners, at 
its meeting held this day, upheld the planning 
commission approval and denied the request of 
B.A.M. Development, Inc , for an appeal on PL-
97-1063, Westndge Meadows 7755 West 3500 
South " Patterson, then, is quite unlike the case 
before us 
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lowed to get at the facts.") (emphasis added) 
(decided under former section 10-9-15). Ac-
cord Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 
P.2d 704, 709-10 (Utah CtApp.), cert, de-
nied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
1126 Accordingly, the appeal is ripe for 
decision by this court and, in my view, it 
should be resolved at this juncture.5 If I 
were writing the opinion for the court, I 
would write as follows: 
1127 Plaintiff B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. 
(BAM) appeals the trial court's decision hold-
ing that Defendant Salt Lake County (the 
County), acting pursuant to its Transporta-
tion Master Plan, could constitutionally re-
quire BAM to dedicate a fifty-three-foot 
right-of-way, without compensation, as a con-
dition to approval of BAM's subdivision pro-
posal. The trial court's decision should be 
reversed and remanded. 
BACKGROUND6 
U28 Salt Lake County Ordinance 
15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-801 (2001), requires dedi-
cation and improvement of public street 
right-of-way space by developers of abutting 
property in accordance with the County's 
Transportation Master Plan. The Transpor-
tation Master Plan is based on traffic projec-
tions and recommendations from the Was-
atch Front Regional Council and the Utah 
Department of Transportation (UDOT), in-
cluding a long-range transportation study 
projecting highway capacity needs in Salt 
Lake County to the year 2020. 
U29 In July of 1997, BAM submitted a 
proposal to develop Westridge Meadows sub-
division on a fifteen-acre parcel at approxi-
mately 7700 West 3500 South in unincorpo-
rated Salt Lake County. BAM's fee simple 
interest in the parcel proposed for subdivi-
sion development extended to the center line 
of 3500 South Street at its northern bound-
ary. Pursuant to Salt Lake County Ordi-
nance 15.28.010, BAM's proposed plat indi-
cated a forty-foot half-road-width dedication 
at 3500 South Street, running along the 
northern boundary of BAM's adjacent prop-
erty. The dedication was to be used for the 
eventual widening of 3500 South, a state 
highway abutting the proposed subdivision. 
3500 South is a thoroughfare used by the 
traveling public, which will also be used by 
future subdivision residents, although the 
highway is not directly accessible from the 
subdivision. 
1130 On September 9, 1997, the County 
approved BAM's subdivision proposal subject 
to compliance with County ordinances and 
departmental requirements in these terms: 
1. Construction of curb, gutter, sidewalk 
and street improvements on proposed 
and adjoining streets including 3500 
South (sidewalk on 3500 South to be 6' 
wide and placed next to the fence). 
2. Elimination, relocation, piping, or fenc-
ing open ditches and/or canals within or 
adjacent to the subdivision by subdivider 
as agreeable to irrigation users or com-
pany. 
3. Construction of a 6' high non-climbable 
barrier fence along 3500 South as these 
lots are non-vehicular access to 3500 
South. A gate is to be constructed on 
each lot for property owner access and 
this note to be on Mylar. 
4. Dedication of 40' from the center line 
of 3500 South to Salt Lake County for 
street right-of-way. 
5. Modification of design as worked out 
by County Departments and subdivider. 
6. Final plat to be drawn on a subdivision 
mylar by a licensed surveyor. 
7. Street on west to be dedicated and 
constructed with curb and gutter on 
5. This sound approach, fully consistent with the analysis. Remanding this case to the trial court, 
plain language of the statutory sections analyzed, 
also advances the cause of avoiding inefficiency, 
duplication, and delay. Considerable court re-
sources have already been expended on this case, 
resulting in a two-day bench trial which pro-
duced a voluminous record. It has been briefed 
and argued to this court and, as will be obvious, 
has been the object of much deliberation and 
with instructions to send it back to the County to 
repeat the fact-finding process, is repugnant to 
the important principle of judicial economy. 
i. This opinion borrows liberally from the trial 
court's Findings of Fact. 
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west side and curb, gutter & sidewalk on 
east side. 
8. Comply with all conditions of the .2 
overpressure zone. This note to be on 
mylar. 
9. A minimum 15' wide landscaping area 
to be installed along 3500 South. The 
landscape strip to be maintained by the 
adjacent property owner. Plan to be 
approved by Development Services 
Staff. 
10. Install traffic calming devices as ap-
proved by Transportation Engineer. 
1131 On September 15, 1997, UDOT re-
ceived BAM's subdivision proposal. UDOT 
responded that the current required highway 
dedication for 3500 South at the location of 
BAM's proposed subdivision was a fifty-
three-foot half-road-width right-of-way, not 
forty feet, as indicated by the County's 
Transportation Master Plan. In June of 1998, 
the County incorporated the revised right-of-
way requirement of fifty-three feet into its 
Transportation Master Plan. That same 
month, the County granted preliminary ap-
proval of BAM's subdivision proposal subject 
to compliance with, among other things, the 
fifty-three-foot right-of-way dedication.7 
1! 32 On July 2, 1998, BAM filed a notice of 
appeal with the Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners, challenging the constitution-
ality of the County's requirement of a fifty-
three-foot dedication and the resulting "in-
creased expenses" and requesting approval 
of the subdivision proposal with a forty-foot 
dedication. The Board of County Commis-
sioners summarily denied BAM's appeal, and 
BAM filed suit against the County in district 
court, alleging, among other things, that the 
County's development exactions were "unrea-
sonable and excessive" and effected a taking 
of BAM's property without just compensa-
tion. After a two-day bench trial, the trial 
court entered judgment in favor of the Coun-
7. The June 1998 approval was contingent upon 
additional requirements which, aside from the 
fifty-three-foot dedication, substantially mirror 
the September 1997 requirements listed above 
However, the June 1998 approval eliminated the 
former requirement regarding ''[a] minium 15' 
wide landscaping area along 3500 South" 
and added a requirement that the landowner 
ty on all counts, concluding that, inter aha, 
"BAM failed to establish a cause of action on 
its 'takings' claim." The trial court subse-
quently denied BAM's "Motion for Entry of 
New Findings and/or Additional Findings" 
and its "Motion for a New Trial," and BAM 
appealed to this court. 
1133 While the above litigation was in pro-
cess, the County approved BAM's amended 
subdivision plat, which had been modified, 
under protest, to include the required fifty-
three-foot highway dedication. In August of 
1999, BAM's subdivision plat was recorded in 
the Salt lake County Recorder's Office, and 
BAM later began construction of Westridge 
Meadows. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1134 BAM raises several issues on appeal, 
but its first argument is dispositive. BAM 
argues that requiring it to dedicate property 
for eventual use in widening a street, and 
improve adjacent property, all without com-
pensation, as a condition to approval of its 
subdivision proposal, constitutes an unconsti-
tutional "taking" of its property in violation 
of both federal and state law. This question 
of law is reviewed under the "correction-of-
error standard[ ]," with no particular defer-
ence accorded to the trial court. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Introduction: Takings Jurisprudence 
1135 BAM argues that requiring it to dedi-
cate a fifty-three foot strip of property and 
undertake various improvements to property 
outside the subdivision as a condition to ap-
proval of its subdivision proposal effects a 
"taking" in violation of state and federal con-
stitutional law. Before proceeding to the 
merits of this claim, it is necessary to discern 
the nature of BAM's takings challenge.8 In 
"[ljnstall an emergency service turnaround as 
required by the Fire Department " 
8. At oral argument, BAM correctly characterized 
its claim as one for inverse condemnation, which 
"is simply a generic description applicable to all 
actions in which a property owner, in the ab-
sence of a formal condemnation [i.e, eminent 
domain] proceeding, seeks to recover from a 
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so doing, this opinion first summarizes rele-
vant United States Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.9 
1136 The Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co v. Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 241, 17 S.Ct. 581, 586, 41 L.Ed. 
979 (1897), provides that "private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without 
just compensation." 10 U.S. Const, amend. V. 
The Court has traditionally recognized two 
categories of takings: "physical takings" and 
so-called "regulatory takings." See, e.g., Yee 
v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527, 112 
S.Ct. 1522, 1528, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992) (dis-
tinguishing the Court's "regulatory takings 
cases" from its "physical takings" cases); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3173, 
73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (distinguishing a 
"physical occupation" from a "regulation that 
merely restricts the use of property"); Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 124-25, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 
L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (implicitly recognizing 
distinct categories of physical and regulatory 
takings); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parcho-
movsky, Gwings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 559 
(2001) ("[I]t is indisputable that the case law 
recognizes the existence of two types of tak-
governmental entity for the appropriation of his 
property interest " 2A Nichols, Eminent Do-
main § 6 14[1], at 6-227 (3d ed 2002) "[T]he 
inverse condemnation action is available to any 
landowner who suffers destruction or impair-
ment of a protected private property right " Id 
§ 6 14[1], at 6-230 Moreover, although BAM 
correctly points out that inverse condemnation 
claims brought under Article I, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution are "self-executing," this 
means only that such claims may be brought 
even absent authorizing legislation and that such 
claims are exempt from the limitations found in 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act See Col-
man v Utah State Land Bd, 795 P 2d 622, 630-
35 (Utah 1990) It does not follow, as BAM 
contends, that inverse condemnation claims are 
automatically exempt from requirements such as 
exhaustion of administrative remedies 
9. The lack of a "coherent test" and resulting "sea 
of uncertainty" in takings law inspired one pair 
of commentators to quip that "takings jurispru-
dence is considered a leading candidate for the 
'doctnne-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-prmciple 
prize ' " Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomov-
sky, Givings, 111 Yale LJ 547, 558-60 (2001) 
(citation omitted) Another scholar noted that 
ings: physical takings and regulatory tak-
ings."). Each of these more familiar types of 
takings, and a third category known as "de-
velopment exactions," are addressed below. 
A. Physical Takings 
1137 A physical taking requires govern-
ment activity in the form of an invasion, 
occupation, or intrusion. See, e.g., Loretto, 
458 U.S. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171. "[Gov-
ernmental action [that] results in '[a] per-
manent physical occupation' of the property, 
by the government itself or by others," Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 
825, 831, 107 S.Ct 3141, 3146 (1987) (second 
alteration in original) (citation omitted), con-
stitutes a per se taking and "requires com-
pensation under the [Takings] Clause." Pa-
lazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 
121 S.Ct. 2448, 2457, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 
(2001). See also Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 
S.Ct. 2886, 2893, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) 
("[A]t least with regard to permanent inva-
sions[ ], no matter how minute the intru-
sion, and no matter how weighty the public 
purpose behind it, we have required com-
pensation."). Cf Yee, 503 U.S. at 539, 112 
S.Ct. at 1534 ("Because the ordinance 
does not compel a landowner to suffer the 
"[t]he incoherence of the U S Supreme Court's 
output in this field has by now been demonstrat-
ed time and again by practitioners and academic 
commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add 
to the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for 
the paper consumed in this frustrating and in-
creasingly pointless enterprise " Gideon Kan-
ner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark Has the 
U S Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort 
to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 
30 The Urban Lawyer 307, 308 (Spring 1998) 
Nevertheless, a summary of takings jurispru-
dence is important in the disposition of BAM's 
appeal, especially considering the dearth of Utah 
case law on the subject 
10. Similarly, the Utah Constitution provides that 
"[p]nvate property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation " 
Utah Const art I, § 22 The Utah provision 
has been characterized as broader than its feder-
al counterpart because it protects not only prop-
erty that is "taken," but also property that is 
"damaged" for public use See Bagford v Ephra-
im City, 904 P 2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995) 
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physical occupation of his property, it does 
not effect a per se taking under Loretto") 
(emphasis in original). 
B. Regulatory Takings 
1138 In contrast to a physical taking, a 
regulatory takings claim challenges state or 
local laws that impose "regulations" or "re-
strictions" on the "use " of property. Yee, 
503 U.S. at 532, 539, 112 S.Ct. at 1531, 1534 
(emphasis in original). See Loretto, 458 U.S. 
at 430, 102 S.Ct. at 3173 ("[RJecent cases 
confirm the distinction between a permanent 
physical occupation and a regulation that 
merely restricts the use of property."). In 
the famous words of Justice Holmes, "while 
property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 
160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). However, "[i]n 70-
odd years of succeeding regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, [the Court has] generally es-
chewed any set formula for determining how 
far is too far." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 112 
S.Ct. at 2893 (quotations and citations omit-
ted). Instead, the Court has "examined the 
taking question by engaging in essentially ad 
hoc, factual inquiries that have identified sev-
eral factors—such as the economic impact of 
the regulation, its interference with reason-
able investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the governmental action—that 
have particular significance." MacDonald, 
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 
340, 349,106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 
(1986) (quotations and citations omitted). 
11. The per se rule of Lucas is not absolute, but is 
limited by "the restnctions that background prin-
ciples of the State's law of property and nuisance 
already place upon land ownership " Lucas v 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U S 1003, 
1028, 112 SCt 2886, 2900, 120 L Ed 2d 798 
(1992) 
12. It is helpful to think of exactions as sort of a 
hybrid between physical and regulatory takings 
The Court acknowledged as much in Nollan v 
California Coastal Commission when it charac-
terized "a classic right-of-way easement" as a 
physical taking but nevertheless applied the regu-
latory takings test 483 US 825, 831 & n 1, 
107 SCt 3141, 3146 & n 1, 97 L Ed 2d 677 
(1987) ("We think a 'permanent physical occupa-
tion' has occurred where individuals are giv-
en a permanent and continuous right to pass to 
1139 Despite the ad hoc nature of regulato-
ry takings inquiries, at least one general rule 
has emerged: "[T]he Fifth Amendment is 
violated when land-use regulation 'does not 
substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests or denies an owner economically viable 
use of his land.'" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016, 
112 S.Ct. at 2894 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Agvns v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 
100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 
(1980)).11 Cf. Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake 
City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Utah Ct.App.1988) 
("Where governmental action, not amounting 
to a physical taking, effectively deprives a 
property owner of reasonable access to prop-
erty, the owner is entitled to compensa-
tion[.]") (footnote omitted). This general 
rule incorporates the underlying principle 
that while "[o]ur cases have not elaborated 
on the standards for determining what con-
stitutes a 'legitimate state interest[,]' 
[t]hey have made clear that a broad 
range of governmental purposes and regula-
tions satisfies these requirements." Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 834-35, 107 S.Ct. at 3147. See 
also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 
3179 ("We do not question the sub-
stantial authority upholding a State's broad 
power to impose appropriate restrictions 
upon an owner's use of his property.") (em-
phasis m original). 
C. Development Exactions 
1140 Along with the traditional categories 
of physical and regulatory takings, a third 
category of takings has emerged in the case 
law, namely "development exactions."12 
and fro, so that the real property may continu-
ously be traversed, even though no particular 
individual is permitted to station himself perma-
nently upon the premises ") The Court ex-
plained "Given, then, that requiring uncompen-
sated conveyance of the easement outright would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the question 
becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed as a 
condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the 
outcome" Id at 834, 107 SCt at 3147 The 
Court then applied the regulatory takings test of 
whether the regulation " 'substantially ad-
vancefs] legitimate state interests' and does not 
'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his 
l and ' " Id (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted) 
Similarly, in Dolan v City of Tigard, the Court 
distinguished the garden-vanety regulatory tak-
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Cite as 87 P.3d 710 (UtahApp. 2004) 
" '[Development exactions may be defined as that development exactions-
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contributions to a governmental entity im-
posed as a condition precedent to approving 
the developer's project. Usually, exactions 
are imposed prior to the issuance of a build-
ing permit or zoning/subdivision approval/ " 
Salt Lake County v. Board of Educ, 808 
P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (citation omit-
ted). Exactions will generally "serve more 
than a single development," 8A Nichols, Emi-
nent Domain § 17.01, at 17-7 (2002), and 
" 'may take the form of: (1) mandatory dedi-
cations of land for roads, schools or parks, as 
a condition to plat approval, (2) fees-in-keu of 
mandatory dedication, (3) water or sewage 
connection fees and (4) impact fees/" Salt 
Lake County v. Board of Educ, 808 P.2d at 
1058 (citation omitted). Exactions "enable 
local government to acquire land for highway 
expansion at no charge to the public. The 
dedicated land is reserved m its present state 
until the government is ready to widen the 
adjacent highway or construct a new road-
way." 8A Nichols, Eminent Domain 
§ 17.02[3], at 17-17. 
1f 41 In the famous Nollan and Dolan deci-
sions, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994); 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 
(1987), the Court adopted a two-pronged test 
mgs cases from the case before it, which involved 
a redevelopment permit conditioned upon a 
forced dedication of land See 512 U S 374, 
385, 114 SCt 2309, 2316, 129 L Ed 2d 304 
(1994) The Court stated 
First, [those cases] involved essentially legisla-
tive determinations classifying entire areas of 
the city, whereas here the city made an adjudi-
cative decision to condition petitioner's appli-
cation for a building permit on an individual 
parcel Second, the conditions imposed were 
not simply a limitation on the use petitioner 
might make of her own parcel, but a require-
ment that she deed portions of the property to 
the city 
Id (emphasis added) Thus, it is clear that exac-
tions do not fit neatly into either the regulatory 
or physical takings jurisprudence See Rogers 
Mach , Inc v Washington County, 181 Or App 
369, 45 P 3d 966, 973 (characterizing exactions 
as an "amalgamation" between physical and reg-
ulatory takings and noting that "[ejxactions do 
not fit neatly within the more conventional Tak-
ings Clause analytical construct"), review denied, 
334 Or 492, 52 P 3d 1057 (Or 2002), cert denied, 
538 US 906, 123 SCt 1482, 155 L Ed 2d 225 
(2003), Town of Flower Mound v Stafford Es-
•at least when 
they take the form of forced dedications of 
property—must satisfy to withstand scrutiny 
under the Takings Clause.13 In Nollan, the 
Court revisited the "long[-]recognized" rule 
that a "land-use regulation does not effect a 
taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legiti-
mate state interests' and does not *den[y] an 
owner economically viable use of his land.'" 
Id. at 834, 107 S.Ct. at 3147 (second and 
third alterations in original) (citation omit-
ted). The Court acknowledged that it had 
"not elaborated on the standards for deter-
mining what constitutes a legitimate state 
interest' or what type of connection between 
the regulation and the state interest satisfies 
the requirement that the former 'substantial-
ly advance' the latter." Id. In addressing 
these questions, the Court set forth the first 
prong of the Nollan/Dolan test: there must 
be an "'essential nexus' between the 
'legitimate state interest' and the permit con-
dition exacted by the [governmental entity]." 
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 114 S.Ct. at 2317 
(quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837,107 S.Ct. at 
3148). 
U42 In Dolan, the Court resolved the 
question it left unanswered in Nollan. If an 
"essential nexus" exists, what is the required 
degree of connection between the exactions 
tates, 71 SW3d 18, 30 (Tex App) ("In an exac-
tion takings case, the landowner is not simply 
denied or restricted in some desired use of his 
property Rather, in an exaction takings case, 
some action—the exaction—is required of the 
landowner as a condition to obtaining govern-
mental approval "), review granted, 2002 Tex 
LEXIS 209 (Tex 2002), Sparks v Douglas Coun-
ty, 127 Wash 2d 901, 904 P 2d 738, 742 (1995) 
(recognizing that "[the physical takings] rule 
does not necessarily apply where c onveyance 
of a property right is required as a condition for 
issuance of a land permit"), 8 Nichols, Eminent 
Domain § 14E 04[4], at 14E-33 & 14E-34 (2002) 
("[T]he Dolan rule applies only to case-by-case 
land exactions, and not to community wide zon-
ing and land use regulations "), Taking "Takings 
Rights" Seriously A Debate on Property Rights 
Legislation Before the 104th Congress, 9 Am U 
Admin L J 253, 277 (1995) (designating Dolan 
as an example of a "special category of cases 
called dedication and exaction cases") 
13. As explained more fully below, it is unclear 
whether the Court's analysis applies to develop-
ment exactions other than forced dedications of 
property 
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and the projected impact of the proposed 
development? 14 In response, the Court set 
forth the "rough proportionality" prong of 
the test, which requires the governmental 
entity to "make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development." Do-
lan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. 
1143 To summarize the Nollan/Dolan two-
prong test, a development exaction in the 
form of a forced dedication of real property 
will constitute a taking, necessitating just 
compensation, unless the government demon-
strates that (1) an "'essential nexus' exists 
between the 'legitimate state interest' and 
the permit condition exacted by the [govern-
mental entity]," and (2) "the required dedica-
tion is related both in nature and extent to 
the impact of the proposed development." 
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391, 114 S.Ct. at 
2317, 2319-20. 
H 44 After considering the rules and ratio-
nales underlying physical, regulatory, and ex-
actions takings cases, it appears that BAM's 
claim most closely fits within the framework 
of the development exactions cases. The 
County conditioned approval of BAM's pro-
posed subdivision on dedication of property 
to be used in the future for widening 3500 
South—at least if the County's Master 
Transportation Plan were to be eventually 
implemented. The forced dedication is a 
" 'contribution ] to a governmental entity 
imposed as a condition precedent to approv-
ing the developer's project,'" which is within 
the definition of an exaction as set forth in 
Salt Lake County v. Board of Education, 808 
14. The Court did not address this question in 
Nollan because, while it "agreed that the Coastal 
Commission's concern with protecting visual ac-
cess to the ocean constituted a legitimate public 
interest," the Court determined there was no 
"essential nexus" between "visual access to the 
ocean and a permit condition requiring lateral 
public access along the Nollans' beachfront lot" 
Dolan, 512 U S at 386-87, 114 S Ct at 2317 
Because the "essential nexus" prong was not 
satisfied, the Court had no occasion to decide 
"the required degree of connection between the 
exactions and the projected impact of the pro-
posed development" Id. at 386, 114 S Ct at 
2317 
15. In any event, it is far from clear that exhaus-
tion requirements would apply to BAM, at least 
P.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). More impor-
tantly, the facts of this case mirror the facts 
of both Nollan, where the landowner was 
forced to grant an easement to the public in 
exchange for a building permit, and Dolan, 
where the landowner was forced to dedicate 
a portion of her property to the city of 
Tigard in exchange for a development per-
mit. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86, 114 
S.Ct. at 2317. 
H45 Having concluded that BAM has stat-
ed a claim for an exaction in the form of a 
forced dedication of real property, it is neces-
sary to determine what, if any, procedural 
requirements BAM must comply with and 
whether it has done so in this case. 
II. Preservation of Issues 
11 46 The County argues, and the trial court 
agreed, that "the only issue appealed by 
BAM to the County Commission, and thus 
preserved by exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, was the County's requirement of a 
53-foot highway dedication, rather than a 40-
foot dedication." Thus, the County main-
tains that "the only issue properly before this 
Court" is whether the thirteen-foot increase 
in the County's dedication requirement ef-
fected a taking of BAM's property. BAM, 
on the other hand, urges us to address the 
constitutionality of the entire fifty-three-foot 
dedication as well as the County's additional 
in-kind improvement requirements. 
H47 Although the County phrases its argu-
ment in jurisdictional terms, the County's 
objection, in reality, is one of issue-preserva-
tion rather than exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.15 Tellingly, the County concedes 
insofar as its challenge to the County's forced 
dedication of real property is concerned It is 
true that in reference to a garden-variety land-
use regulation, "an essential prerequisite to its 
assertion is a final and authoritative determina-
tion of the type and intensity of development 
legally permitted on the subject property A 
court cannot determine whether a regulation has 
gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regula-
tion goes " MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v 
Yolo County, Ml U S 340, 348, 106 S Ct 2561, 
2566, 91 L.Ed 2d 285 (1986). Such logic does 
not apply to a development exaction consisting of 
a forced dedication of real property. The County 
did not attempt to regulate the "use" of BAM's 
land, but conditioned its approval of BAM's sub-
division proposal on a forced dedication of real 
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that "BAM followed the appeal procedure 
outlined in the Utah statute and correspond-
ing Salt Lake County Ordinance provi-
sion[s]." Thus, the County's real quarrel is 
with the wording of BAM's appeal to the 
Board of County Commissioners, which chal-
lenges the County's decision to deny develop-
ment approval with the 40-foot dedication 
and argues that the County's imposition of 
"increased expenses and uncompensated ded-
ication of private property for public use, is 
arbitrary, capricious, .. and contrary to 
law." 
1148 It is true that "a party seeking review 
of agency action must raise an issue before 
that agency to preserve the issue for further 
review." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). Pursuant to the 
"level of consciousness" test, "a plaintiff 
[must] bring an issue to the fact finder's 
attention so that there is at least the possibil-
ity that it could be considered." 16 Id. 
149 It must be concluded that BAM's ap-
peal properly encompassed its objection to 
the entire dedication of real property such 
that the Board of County Commissioners 
was, or should have been, conscious of it. 
BAM's argument that the County should 
have approved its proposal with the 40-foot 
dedication does not foreclose its further ar-
gument that the County's requirement of 
"uncompensated dedication of private prop-
erty," in whatever amount, is "unconstitu-
tional." 
11 50 Furthermore, this case is in a some-
what unusual posture because the "level of 
consciousness" test is being applied not to a 
hearing or other administrative proceeding, 
but to BAM's written notice of appeal. Cf. 
Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (applying level of 
consciousness test to informal hearing before 
State Engineer); US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah 
property The only question is whether the 
County's exaction of BAM's property constituted 
a taking See Nelson v City of Lake Oswego, 126 
Or App 416, 869 P 2d 350, 353 (1994) (en banc) 
("[No] case of which we are aware attaches an 
exhaustion or ripeness prerequisite to the litiga-
tion of claims, like those here, that are based on 
a development condition that has resulted in the 
actual acquisition of a private property interest 
by the government") 
State Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 n. 7 
(Utah Ct.App.1994) (applying level of con-
sciousness test to hearing before State Tax 
Commission); Ashcroft v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah Ct. 
App.) (holding that plaintiff waived issues not 
presented to the administrative law judge 
during formal hearing), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 
95 (Utah 1993). In light of the fact that the 
County Commission summarily denied 
BAM's appeal without a hearing, foreclosing 
the opportunity for BAM to develop and 
explain its concerns, an unnecessarily 
crabbed reading of BAM's notice of appeal is 
not required by the "level of consciousness" 
test, and that test does not foreclose consid-
eration of the constitutionality of requiring 
the entire fifty-three-foot dedication. 
1151 A different conclusion is reached, how-
ever, on the question of whether BAM prop-
erly preserved its objection to the County's 
requirement that certain in-kind improve-
ments be made. On appeal, BAM chal-
lenges, to an unclear extent, a number of 
improvements required by the County as a 
condition to subdivision approval, including 
installation of curbs, gutters, stormdrain 
lines, sidewalks, and fencing. BAM argues 
that such improvements are "unconstitution-
ally excessive and/or unreasonable." The 
only possible evidence of preservation of this 
argument in BAM's written appeal to the 
Board of County Commissioners is in BAM's 
objection to the County's "increased ex-
penses." Even under the most liberal con-
struction of BAM's notice of appeal, it cannot 
be said that this issue was sufficiently raised 
such that the Board of County Commission-
ers should have been conscious of it. 
11 52 Furthermore, even if BAM had prop-
erly preserved this argument, BAM advances 
no convincing argument that the County's 
improvement requirements should be invali-
16. The "level of consciousness" test is a "less 
exacting standard" than that applied in a trial 
setting, where preservation requires that "(1) 'the 
issue be raised in a timely fashion,' (2) 'the 
issue be specifically raised,' and (3)[the] par-
ty must introduce 'supporting evidence or rele-
vant legal authority.' " Badger v Brooklyn Canal 
Co , 966 P 2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (quoting Hart 
v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 
(Utah Ct.App ), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1997)) 
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dated, or for that matter even analyzed, un-
der Nollan and Dolan.11 The County cannot 
force BAM to dedicate and improve 3500 
South based solely on its own transportation 
planning goals, rather than on the impacts of 
BAM's subdivision, because this would force 
BAM "alone to bear public burdens which, m 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 
L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). Nevertheless, there is 
"an important distinction between ordinances 
requiring installation of streets, sidewalks, 
sewers and drainage facilities which are inex-
tricably tied to the needs of the subdivision 
development, and those ordinances which re-
quire dedication of land where the nexus 
between the use requirement and the subdi-
vision development is less than evident." 2A 
Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.13[3][b], at 6 
218 (3d ed.2002). See also AH Piculell 
Group v. Clackamas County, 142 Or.App. 
327, 922 P.2d 1227,1234 (1996) ("[Conditions 
that in whole or in part serve the needs of 
the development itself should be weighed 
differently than pure factions* of the kind 
that serve only to mitigate an impact of the 
development on the public or public facili-
ties."). 
1153 For example, the County's require-
ment that BAM install a fence and a sidewalk 
along the portion of its property abutting 
3500 South seems to be "inextricably tied to 
17. This is not to say that improvement exactions 
may never be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny 
See McClure v City of Springfield, 175 OrApp 
425, 28 P3d 1222, 1227-28 (2001) (applying 
Dolan to city ordinance requiring dedication of 
property and installation of sidewalks, driveway 
improvements, and street lighting), review denied, 
334 Or 327, 52 P 3d 435 (2002), Art Piculell 
Group v Clackamas County, 142 OrApp 327, 
922 P2d 1227, 1230-31 (1996) (applying Dolan 
to county requirement that landowner dedicate 
and approve public street abutting his subdivi-
sion), Clark v City of Albany, 137 OrApp 293, 
904 P2d 185, 189 (1995) (applying Dolan to 
improvement exactions because the court saw 
"little difference between a requirement that a 
developer convey title to the part of the property 
that is to serve a public purpose, and a require-
ment that the developer himself make improve-
ments on the affected and nearby property and 
make it available for the same purpose"), review 
denied, 322 Or 644, 912 P 2d 375 (1996), Town 
of Flower Mound v Stafford Estates, 71 S W 3d 
18, 33 (TexCtApp) (applying Dolan to town 
ordinance requiring road improvements because 
the needs of [BAM's] subdivision," 2A Nich-
ols, Eminent Domain § 6.13[3][b], at 6-218, 
because such improvements undoubtedly in-
ure to the convenience and safety of the 
subdivision residents. In any event, absent 
proper preservation at the County Commis-
sion level and a well-developed argument on 
appeal, BAM's objection to the County's in-
kind improvement requirements need be ad-
dressed no further. 
III. Merits of BAM's Takings Challenge 
1154 Having resolved the threshold issue of 
preservation, this opinion proceeds to the 
merits of BAM's takings challenge. Al-
though BAM has formulated its takings chal-
lenge to include separate claims for relief 
under both state and federal law, the legal 
principles underlying both claims are largely 
the same and this opinion therefore treats 
them concurrently. See, e.g., San Remo Ho-
tel v. City & County of San Francisco, 27 
Cal.4th 643, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P.3d 87, 
100-101 (2002) (construing federal and state 
takings clauses congruently); Sparks v. 
Douglas County, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 
738, 741 (1995) (same). 
1155 As outlined above, it must now be 
determined whether the two-pronged Nol-
lan/Dolan test is satisfied here. The Coun-
ty, however, argues that the Nollan/Dolan 
improvement exactions "involve conditional gov-
ernmental land use approval and present the 
same opportunities for governmental 'leveraging' 
[as dedicatory exactions]"), review granted, 2002 
Tex LEXIS 209 (Tex 2002), Benchmark Land v 
City of Battle Ground, 94 Wash App 537, 972 
P2d 944, 950 (1999) (holding that "Nollan and 
Dolan apply here where the City requires the 
developer as a condition of approval to incur 
substantial costs improving an adjoining street"), 
affd on other grounds, 146 Wash 2d 685, 49 P 3d 
860 (2002), Burton v Clark County, 91 Wash 
App 505, 958 P 2d 343, 348, 357 (1998) (apply-
ing Nollan/Dolan to county requirement that per-
mit applicants make "road dedications and im-
provements"), review denied, 137 Wash 2d 1015, 
978 P 2d 1097 (1999) But see Parking Ass'n of 
Georgia, Inc v City of Atlanta, 264 Ga 764, 450 
S E 2d 200, 201-02, 204 (1994) (refusing to ap-
ply Dolan to city parking lot ordinance requinng 
owners to install barner curbs and landscaping 
improvements even though three dissenting jus-
tices argued that Nollan and Dolan were control-
ling), cert denied, 515 US 1116, 115 S Ct 2268, 
132 L Ed 2d 273 (1995) 
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exactions analysis does not apply to this case. 
Specifically, the County argues, and the trial 
court agreed, that the Nollan/Dolan analysis 
applies only to "ad hoc discretionary assess-
ment[s] imposed on an individualized basis" 
and not to "a generally-applicable legislative 
scheme, uniformly imposing a regulatory 
standard for road-width dedication by subdi-
vision developments." 18 
18. It should be noted that unrebutted evidence 
introduced at trial casts substantial doubt on this 
charactenzation in any event For example, tes-
timony from William A Marsh, a land-use plan-
ner employed by Salt Lake County for over twen-
ty-eight years, elicited the following information 
Q Okay How does the county determine 
how much that developer then dedicates, 
m other words, what the half width actual-
ly is? 
A When the subdivision application is pro-
cessed, the recommendation is sent out 
In the case of 3500 South, where it's a 
state highway, it goes to the county trans-
portation engineer and to UDOT 
Q Okay And who makes that determination 
as to what the half width is? 
A It would be based on the recommenda-
tions that come back from those agencies 
Q Okay So at any given moment we can't, 
say, look in the book and see what that 
half width determination is? 
A We have the map that guides us, but until 
we get the final written recommendation 
we don't know for sure 
Such testimony belies the County's assurances 
that there is no discretion involved in assessing 
its road-width dedication requirements 
19. There has been some confusion about whether 
Nollan and Dolan imposed a new form of height-
ened scrutiny In Nollan, the Court stated that 
"our verbal formulations in the takings field have 
generally been quite different" from "those ap-
plied to due process or equal protection claims" 
because "[w]e have required that the regulation 
'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state inter-
est' sought to be achieved, not that 'the State 
"could rationally have decided " that the measure 
adopted might achieve the State's objective 
483 US at 834 n 3, 107 S Ct at 3147 n 3 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted) There-
fore, Nollan and Dolan could be interpreted as 
merely clarifying the heightened scrutiny that 
already applied to regulatory takings claims 
See, e g, Smith Inv Co v Sandy City, 958 P 2d 
245, 258 n 18 (Utah CtApp 1998) ("[Tjhe tak-
ings analysis adds the word 'substantially' 
before 'advance ' Thus, this standard appears to 
be more stringent than the standard against 
which we measured the substantive due process 
validity of the ordinance") However, the 
Court's subsequent warning about being "partic-
ularly careful about the adjective" of "substan-
tial" when an "actual conveyance of property" is 
1156 In the instant case, it should not 
matter whether the County ordinance at is-
sue here is indeed a "generally applicable" 
"uniformly imposed" legislative scheme be-
cause Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny19 
should apply to any forced dedication of real 
property, regardless of whether the exactions 
are imposed on an individualized basis or via 
a comprehensive legislative scheme.20 This 
at issue, Nollan, 483 U S at 841, 107 S Ct at 
3150-51, implies that such claims are subject to 
increased scrutiny beyond that applied to gar-
den-variety land-use regulations As discussed in 
Note 20, courts and commentators have disa-
greed about what type of cases invoke Nollan/Do-
lan scrutiny Most, however, agree that Nollan 
and Dolan do impose some sort of heightened 
scrutiny See, e g, San Remo Hotel v City & 
County of San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 117 
Cal Rptr 2d 269, 41 P 3d 87, 102 (2002) (" 'Thus 
in Nollan, the rule that [physical occupations are 
per se takings] is transformed, in the context of a 
development application, into a rule of height-
ened scrutiny to ensure that a required develop-
ment dedication is not a mere pretext to obtain 
or otherwise physically invade property without 
just compensation ' ") (citation omitted) See 
also Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains & Real 
Steals Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 Iowa 
L Rev 1, 4, 9-12 (2000) (arguing that "wholesale 
application of Dolan to regulatory takings juris-
prudence would abruptly dismantle nearly seven-
ty-five years of zoning law") 
20. It must be acknowledged that the scope of the 
Nollan/Dolan analysis is unsettled In other 
words, because both Nollan and Dolan were 
decided in the context of forced dedications of 
real property administered, according to the 
Court, on an individualized, adjudicative basis, it 
is unclear whether one or both of those condi-
tions must exist for Nollan/Dolan heightened 
scrutiny to apply See, e g , Fennell, Hard Bar-
gains, 86 Iowa L Rev at 10-11 (stating that two 
uncertainties exist after Nollan and Dolan (1) 
"whether Dolan's requirement of rough propor-
tionality applies when land use 'conditions' are 
not selectively imposed on individual landown-
ers, but are instead embedded in legislative en-
actments" and (2) whether Nollan and Dolan, 
which "both involved actual concessions of land" 
apply to "other kinds of concessions (such as 
cash payments or the provision of unrelated 
amenities)") See also Rogers Math Inc v 
Washington County, 181 OrApp 369, 45 P 3d 
966, 976 (2002) ("In the eight years since Dolan 
was decided, no consensus has emerged among 
lower courts on [the above] questions and, so far, 
the Supreme Court has declined to grant certio-
rari m cases that might have provided further 
guidance "), review denied, 334 Or 492, 52 P 3d 
1057 (2002), cert denied, 538 U S 90b, 123 S Ct 
1482, 155 L Ed 2d 225 (2003) See also, eg, San 
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is so for at least two reasons. First, "[i]t is 
not clear why the existence of a taking 
should turn on the type of governmental 
entity responsible for the taking." Parking 
Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 
U.S. 1116, 115 S.Ct. 2268, 2268-69, 132 
L.Ed.2d 273 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by 
O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of cer-
tiorari). For example, "[a] city council can 
take property just as well as a planing com-
mission can."21 Id. at 1118, 115 S.Ct. at 
2269. See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of 
Schaumburg, 277 Ill.App.3d 926, 214 Ill.Dec. 
526, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] munici-
pality should not be able to insulate itself 
from a takings challenge merely by utilizing 
a different bureaucratic vehicle when expro-
priating its citizen's property."), cert, denied, 
519 U.S. 976, 117 S.Ct. 413, 136 L.Ed.2d 325 
(1996); McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 
Or.App. 425, 28 P.3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (not-
ing parties' stipulation that "the city's enact-
ment of dedication requirements as an ordi-
nance did not relieve it of the obligation to 
make particularized findings showing that 
any resulting exactions were roughly propor-
tional to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment"), review denied, 334 Or. 327, 52 P.3d 
435 (2002). 
Remo Hotel, 117 Cal Rptr 2d 269, 41 P 3d at 
102-05 (discussing scope of Nollani'Dolan analy-
sis), Krupp v Breckenrtdge Sanitation Dist, 19 
P3d 687, 695-98 (Colo 2001) (en banc) (same), 
Town of Flower Mound, 71 S W 3d at 31-35 
(same), Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between 
Legislative & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v 
City ofTigard, 75 NYU L Rev 242, 252 (2000) 
(cataloguing the pervasive confusion among low-
er courts attempting to interpret and apply Do-
lan) 
21. Noting the conflict among lower courts over 
"whether Dolan's test for property regulation 
should be applied in cases where the alleged 
taking occurs through an Act of the legislature," 
Justice Thomas concluded 
It is hardly surprising that some courts have 
applied Dolan's rough proportionality test even 
when considering a legislative enactment 
[T]he general applicability of the ordinance 
should not be relevant m a takings analysis If 
Atlanta had seized several hundred homes in 
order to build a freeway, there would be no 
doubt that Atlanta had taken property The 
distinction between sweeping legislative tak-
ings and particularized administrative takings 
appears to be a distinction without a constitu-
tional difference 
1157 Second, it is not always easy to tell 
the difference between an individualized, ad-
judicative decision and a "uniformly im-
posed" legislative scheme. This ambiguity is 
manifest in Dolan itself, where the majority 
characterized the city's action as an "adjudi-
cative decision" without further explanation, 
while Justice Souter, in dissent, pointed out 
that "the permit conditions were imposed 
pursuant to [the city's] Community Develop-
ment Code."22 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374, 413, n. *, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2331, n. * 
(1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). Distinguish-
ing between adjudicative and legislative ac-
tion is made even more difficult because "lo-
cal governments are not structured under 
stnct separation of powers principles" and 
"the nature of the land use decision-making 
process relies on flexibility and discretion." 
Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legis-
lative & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 242, 257 
(2000).23 Notwithstanding these uncertain-
ties, it must be concluded that all forced 
dedications of property are subject to Nol-
lan/Dolan scrutiny. This conclusion is 
premised on the United States Supreme 
Court's well-settled takings jurisprudence 
Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc , v City of Atlanta, 
515 US 1116, 115 SCt 2268, 2268-69, 132 
L Ed 2d 273 (1995) (Thomas, J , joined by O'Con-
nor, J , dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
22. Specifically, the City of Tigard imposed the 
floodplam exaction pursuant to its Master Drain-
age Plan, codified in its Community Development 
Code and required by the State of Oregon, which 
required land dedications from all permit appli-
cants seeking to develop land "within and adja-
cent to the 100 year floodplam" Dolan, 512 
U S at 377-79, 114 S Ct at 2313-14 Of course, 
these facts are strikingly similar to the ones be-
fore us, where the County, acting pursuant to its 
Transportation Master Plan, required dedications 
from all landowners seeking to develop property 
abutting 3500 South Street It seems, therefore, 
that the County cannot fairly characterize the 
scheme in Dolan as "ad hoc" and "discretion-
ary" without so characterizing its own 
23. Ms Reznik astutely points out that some exac-
tions "are somewhere in the middle of adjudica-
tive and legislative" because "the legislature 
[may give] some guidelines, [while] the adminis-
trative body retam[s] considerable discretion as 
well " Reznik, The Distinction Between Legisla-
tive & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v City of 
Tigard, 75 N Y U L Rev at 266 
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holding that physical invasions, occupations, 
or mandated conveyances of real property 
are entitled to special treatment. As the 
Court stated in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 
our cases describe the condition for 
abridgement of property rights through 
the police power as a 'substantial ad-
vancing]' of a legitimate state interest. 
We are inclined to be particularly careful 
about the adjective where the actual con-
veyance of property is made a condition to 
the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in 
that context there is heightened risk that 
the purpose is avoidance of the compensa-
tion requirement, rather than the stated 
police-power objective. 
483 U.S. 825, 841,107 S.Ct. 3141, 3150-51, 97 
L.Ed.2d 677 (1987) (alteration and first em-
phasis in original). The Court has "re-
peatedly held that, as to property reserved 
by its owner for private use, 'the right to 
exclude [others is] "one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property."'" Id. at 
831, 107 S.Ct. at 3145 (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). Anything less than Nol-
lan/Dolan scrutiny, at least when an actual 
conveyance of property is at issue, falls short 
of adequately protecting these rights. Ac-
cordingly, this opinion now addresses the 
question of whether the County's uncompen-
sated dedication requirement passes muster 
under Nollan. 
A. Nollan and the "Essential Nexus" 
U58 Under Nollan, "[a court] must first 
determine whether the 'essential nexus' ex-
ists between the 'legitimate state interest' 
and the permit condition exacted by the [gov-
ernmental entity]." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 
114 S.Ct. at 2317 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. 
at 836-37, 107 S.Ct. at 3148). In doing so 
here, it is appropriate to review the facts of 
Nollan. 
1159 The Nollans planned to replace their 
beachfront bungalow with a three-bedroom 
house. When they applied to the California 
Coastal Commission for a development per-
mit, the Nollans were told the permit would 
be denied unless they agreed to a public 
easement across their beachfront lot. The 
Commission argued that the easement was 
necessary to advance legitimate state inter-
ests such as "protecting the public's ability to 
see the beach, assisting the public in over-
coming the 'psychological barrier' to using 
the beach created by a developed shorefront, 
and preventing congestion on the public 
beaches." Id. at 835, 107 S.Ct. at 3148. The 
Court assumed, without deciding, that the 
above interests were legitimate and agreed 
with the Commission that "a permit condition 
that serves the same legitimate police-power 
purpose as a refusal to issue the permit 
should not be found to be a taking if the 
refusal to issue the permit would not consti-
tute a taking." Id. at 836, 107 S.Ct. at 3148. 
Thus, if the "Commission could have exer-
cised its police power . . . to forbid construc-
tion of the house altogether," it may, in the 
alternative, impose permit conditions—for 
example, height or width restrictions—that 
would further the legitimate state interest of 
protecting "the public's ability to see the 
beach." Id, 
1160 However, the Court went on to ex-
plain that "[t]he evident constitutional propri-
ety disappears . . . if the condition substitut-
ed for the prohibition utterly fails to further 
the end advanced as the justification for the 
prohibition." Id at 837, 107 S.Ct. at 3148. 
Such was the case in Nollan. The Court 
found it 
quite impossible to understand how a re-
quirement that people already on the pub-
lic beaches be able to walk across the 
Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to 
viewing the beach created by the new 
house[,] how it lowers any "psychological 
barrier" to using the public beaches, or 
how it helps to remedy any additional con-
gestion on them caused by construction of 
the Nollans' new house. 
Id. at 838-39, 107 S.Ct. at 3149. Thus, "the 
lack of nexus between the condition and the 
original purpose of the building restriction 
converts that purpose to something other 
than what it was. The purpose then be-
comes, quite simply, the obtaining of an ease-
ment to serve some valid governmental pur-
pose, but without payment of compensation." 
Id, at 837, 107 S.Ct. at 3149. Such a restric-
tion "is not a valid regulation of land use but 
730 Utah 87 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'" Id. (cita-
tion omitted). 
1161 Having reviewed the holding and ra-
tionale underlying Nollan, this opinion now 
turns to the facts of the instant case. The 
County devotes the majority of its takings 
analysis to argumg that Nollan and Dolan 
are inapphcable to this case. In so doing, 
the County fails to articulate, in the alterna-
tive, the legitimate state interests in support 
of its dedication requirements, arguing only 
in passing that "[s]uch a uniform scheme is 
fundamental to ensuring that community de-
velopment occurs in accordance with sensible 
long-range transportation planning."24 Fol-
lowing the lead of the Nollan Court, it may 
be assumed that the County's traffic goals 
are a legitimate governmental interest.25 
See Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 
245, 255 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (" '[I]t is clear 
that the flow of traffic is a legitimate concern 
of a municipal legislative body in its enact-
ment of zoning regulations.'") (quoting Ken-
neth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning § 3A.04 (4th ed.1996)). Neverthe-
less, the validity of the interest does not, by 
24. The Commission advanced a similar argu-
ment in Nollan, pointing out that it had already 
similarly conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal de-
velopment permits along the same tract of 
land, and that of the 17 not so conditioned, 14 
had been approved when the Commission did 
not have administrative regulations in place 
allowing imposition of the condition, and the 
remaining 3 had not involved shorefront prop-
erty 
483 U S at 829, 107 S Ct at 3144 The Com-
mission argued that such a scheme was neces-
sary as "part of a comprehensive program to 
provide continuous public access along [the 
beach] as the lots undergo development or rede-
velopment" Id at 841, 107 SCt at 3151 The 
Court was unmoved, holding that such a justifi-
cation was "unrelated to land-use regulation" 
and was "simply an expression of the Commis-
sion's belief that the public interest will be served 
by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach 
along the coast " Id The Court continued 
The Commission may well be right that it is a 
good idea, but that does not establish that the 
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can 
be compelled to contribute to its realization 
Rather, California is free to advance its "com-
prehensive program," if it wishes, by using its 
power of eminent domain for this "public pur-
pose 
Id at 841-42, 107 S Ct at 3151 
25. To this end, the County argues that "under 
BAM's view of constitutional law, road-width re-
itself, justify imposing the entire cost of real-
izing that goal upon BAM and other land-
owners whose property abuts 3500 South. 
See 8A Nichols, Emment Domain § 17.01, at 
17-6, 17-7 (2002) (articulating the reasons "it 
makes a great deal of sense for a governmen-
tal agency to attempt to acquire, or at least 
reserve, land for major roads before an area 
develops" but nevertheless noting that "the 
need for reducing the cost of acquiring public 
right-of-way cannot override the consti-
tutional guarantee that an individual's prop-
erty rights be protected"). Rather, the 
County must demonstrate an "essential nex-
us" between that interest and the roadway 
dedication requirements it imposed upon 
BAM. Although the County fails to under-
take this demonstration in its bnef, the rec-
ord reveals unrebutted evidence, introduced 
at trial, that construction of the Westridge 
Meadows subdivision, consisting of forty-four 
single-family units, would increase traffic 
flow along 3500 South only "by approximate-
ly three to four percent."26 
U 62 Clearly, there is an "essential nexus" 
between the problem of increased traffic 
quirements for new construction along major 
traffic corridors would vary radically from par-
cel-to-parcel, depending on the size, usage, and 
other impact characteristics of each individual 
parcel " This would only be true if BAM was 
challenging the County's authority to require 
road-width dedications as a condition of develop-
ment BAM's argument, however, is that while 
the County surely has the authonty to require 
such dedications, it does not have the authority 
to require them for free Contrary to the Coun-
ty's contention, BAM's view would have no effect 
on the uniformity of road width along 3500 
South—it would just mean that the cost of such 
uniformity would be borne by the public, not by 
BAM alone 
26. This conclusion is based on a study promul-
gated by the Institute of Transportation Engi-
neers, which estimates that the typical residential 
dwelling generates an average of ten car trips 
per day Thus, Westridge Meadows, consisting 
of forty-four units, would generate approximately 
440 additional trips per day on 3500 South, the 
nearest major street to which Westridge Mead-
ows residents would have vehicular access Evi-
dence at trial showed that, in 1997, about 13,000 
cars traveled on 3500 South per day Therefore, 
the 440 additional trips generated by the Wes-
tridge Meadows subdivision would increase the 
1997 estimate by, at most, three or four percent 
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along 3500 South, insofar as attributable to 
the subdivision, and the solution of property 
dedication so that 3500 South can eventually 
be widened. The County, understandably, 
must project and prepare for the inevitable 
increase in traffic along state highways. 
Should widening of 3500 South become nec-
essary in the future, the County ideally 
would be able to accomplish this without 
having to buy, only to then demolish and 
remove, existing structures. BAM's subdivi-
sion, as acknowledged by both sides at trial, 
will necessarily contribute, albeit a relatively 
small amount, to increased traffic along 3500 
South and the eventual need for a wider 
road. Thus, the County's roadway dedica-
tion requirements are connected to the goal 
of insuring that the County will be able to 
fulfill that need. Having determined that an 
essential nexus exists between a legitimate 
state interest and the required condition of 
approval, this opinion now addresses whether 
the required dedication is sufficiently related 
in both nature and extent to the impact of 
the proposed development. 
B. Dolan and Rough Proportionality 
1163 Dolan requires this court to deter-
mine whether the exactions demanded by the 
County bear a "rough proportionality" to the 
"projected impact of [BAM's] proposed de-
velopment." 512 U.S. at 388-91, 114 S.Ct. at 
231&-19. In Dolan, the landowner applied 
for a building permit to expand her plumbing 
and electrical supply store. See id. at 379, 
27. As support for the adoption of this test, the 
United States Supreme Court cited Call v City of 
West Jordan, 606 P 2d 217 (Utah 1979) (Call I), 
modified on reh'g, 614 P 2d 1257 (Utah 1980) 
(Call II), the only Utah case of which I am 
aware that addressed the constitutionality of ex-
actions in the form of forced dedications of prop-
erty In Call I, our Supreme Court addressed 
the validity of a city ordinance that required 
subdividers to dedicate seven percent of their 
land, or pay the cash equivalent, as a condition 
to development approval The Court originally 
upheld the ordinance against a takings challenge 
because the dedication, which was to be used for 
" 'flood control and/or parks and recreation facil-
ities,' " bore a "reasonable relationship to the 
needs created by the subdivision " Id at 220 
This was so, the Court held, even though the 
dedication requirements would necessarily bene-
fit the whole community along with the individu-
al subdivision See id 
114 S.Ct. at 2313. The city responded that, 
in exchange for the permit, the landowner 
would be required to dedicate "the portion of 
her property lying within the 100-year flood-
plain for improvement of a storm drainage 
system and that she dedicate an addi-
tional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the 
floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway." 
Id. at 379-80,114 S.Ct. at 2314. As justifica-
tion for these exactions, the city argued, first, 
that the floodplain dedication was necessary 
to alleviate the "anticipated increased storm 
water flow from the subject property to an 
already strained creek and drainage basin." 
Id. at 382, 114 S.Ct. at 2315. Second, the 
city argued that "creation of a convement, 
safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an 
alternative means of transportation 'could 
offset some of the traffic demand on [nearby] 
streets and lessen the increase in traffic con-
gestion'" caused, at least in part, by the 
proposed development. Id. at 381-82, 114 
S.Ct. at 2314. 
11 64 After determining that the above jus-
tifications satisfied the "essential nexus" 
prong of Nollan, the Court was left with the 
question of "whether these findings are con-
stitutionally sufficient to justify the condi-
tions imposed by the city on petitioner's 
building permit." Id. at 389, 114 S.Ct. at 
2318. After reviewing "representative deci-
sions" by State courts addressing this ques-
tion, the Court adopted the "rough propor-
tionality" test.27 Id. at 389-91, 114 S.Ct. at 
After granting the landowner's petition for re-
hearing, however, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that "disposition of this issue as a matter of law 
[is] inappropriate," Call II, 614 P 2d at 1258, 
"without plaintiffs being given the opportunity to 
present evidence to show that the dedication 
required of them had no reasonable relationship 
to the needs for flood control or parks and recre-
ation facilities created by their subdivision, if 
any" Id at 1259 Like the United States Su-
preme Court, I think the "reasonable relation-
ship" test is virtually equivalent to the "rough 
proportionality" test, and thus presents no issue 
of inconsistency between the precedents of the 
United States and Utah Supreme Courts See 
Dolan, 512 U S at 391, 114 S Ct at 2J19 ("[T]he 
'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a major-
ity of the state courts is closer to the federal 
constitutional norm[,] [b]ut we do not adopt 
it as such partly because the term seems 
confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis' 
which describes the minimal level of scrutiny 
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2318-19. In other words, "[n]o precise math-
ematical calculation is required, but the city 
must make some sort of individualized deter-
mination that the required dedication is re-
lated both in nature and extent to the impact 
of the proposed development.', Id. at 391, 
114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. Under this test, the 
Court determined that the city had failed to 
demonstrate that its permit conditions bore a 
"rough proportionality" to the "projected im-
pact of [the landowner's] proposed develop-
ment." Id. at 388-95, 114 S.Ct. at 2318-22. 
1165 Regarding the floodplain dedication, 
the Court acknowledged that "[i]t is axiomat-
ic that increasing the amount of impervious 
surface will increase the quantity and rate of 
storm water flow from petitioner's property." 
Id. at 392, 114 S.Ct. at 2320. "Therefore, 
keeping the floodplain open and free from 
development would likely confine the pres-
sures created by petitioner's develop-
ment." Id. at 393, 114 S.Ct. at 2320. The 
city, however, "demanded more—it not only 
wanted petitioner not to build in the flood-
plain, but it also wanted petitioner's property 
for its greenway system." Id. The city 
failed to explain "why a public greenway, as 
opposed to a private one, was required in the 
interest of flood control." Id. 
1166 Further, "[w]ith respect to the pedes-
trian/bicycle pathway," the Court accepted 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment") Indeed, the Court itself 
used the two terms interchangeably See id at 
391,395, 114 SCt at 2319, 2321 
We are, however, presented with a potential 
conflict between state and federal law insofar as 
Call II, decided before Nollan and Dolan, ap-
pears to place the burden on the party challeng-
ing the dedication to show that it "had no rea-
sonable relationship to the needs created by 
their subdivision," Call II, 614 P 2d at 1259, 
while Dolan places this burden on the entity of 
local government See Dolan, 512 U S at 391 n 
8, 114 SCt at 2320 n 8 (While "in evaluating 
most generally applicable zoning regulations, the 
burden properly rests on the party challenging 
the regulation," the burden is on the government 
to "justify the required dedication" when it 
makes "an adjudicative decision to condition 
[an] application for a building permit on an 
individual parcel ") It must be noted, however, 
that the landowner in Call II, at the request of 
the city, paid a fee instead of actually conveying 
his property to the city, Call I, 606 P 2d at 218, 
so the cases are distinguishable on that basis 
Additionally, in Call v City of West Jordan, 727 
P2d 180 (1986) {Call III), the Court upheld a 
the city's finding that "the larger retail sales 
facility proposed by petitioner [would] in-
crease traffic" in the downtown area by an 
estimated "435 additional trips per day." Id. 
at 395, 114 S.Ct. at 2321. The Court also 
acknowledged that "[dedications for streets, 
sidewalks, and other public ways are general-
ly reasonable exactions to avoid excessive 
congestion from a proposed property use." 
Id. 
1167 Nevertheless, the Court held that the 
city's conclusory statement that "the creation 
of the pathway 'could offset some of the 
traffic demand'" fell far short of "demon-
strating that the additional number of vehicle 
and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's 
development reasonably relate to the city's 
requirement for a dedication of the pedestri-
an/bicycle pathway easement." Id at 395, 
114 S.Ct. at 2321-22 (emphasis added). The 
Court concluded that while 
[t]he city's goals of reducing flooding haz-
ards and traffic congestion, and providing 
for public greenways, are laudable 
there are outer limits to how this may be 
done. "A strong public desire to improve 
the public condition [will not] warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than 
the constitutional way of paying for the 
change." 
trial court order which placed "the burden of 
producing evidence" regarding "the reasonable-
ness of the impact fee" on the city Id at 182 
In so doing, the Court indicated that Call II 
should be interpreted in light of the Court's sub-
sequent decision in Banberry Development Corp 
v South Jordan City, 631 P 2d 899 (Utah 1981), 
which states 
Since the information that must be used to 
assure that subdivision fees are within the 
standard of reasonableness is most accessible 
to the municipality, that body should disclose 
the basis of its calculations to whoever chal-
lenges the reasonableness of its subdivision or 
hookup fees Once that is done, the burden of 
showing failure to comply with the constitu-
tional standard of reasonableness in this mat-
ter is on the challengers 
Id at 904 See also Call III, 727 P 2d at 181 
However, where the burden of proof ultimately 
falls should not affect the outcome here because, 
even if the burden properly rests on BAM, it has 
presented sufficient evidence that the County's 
dedication requirement does not have the requi-
site relationship—whether couched in terms of 
reasonableness or rough proportionality—to the 
impact of BAM's subdivision 
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Id. at 396, 114 S.Ct. at 2322 (quoting Penn- nent Domain § 1.42[2], at 
Utah 733 
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
416, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922)) 
(second alteration in original). 
1168 The justifications advanced in favor of 
the County's highway dedication require-
ments in this case suffer from the same 
shortcomings as those identified in Dolan. 
As acknowledged earlier in this opinion, the 
County's goal of "ensuring that community 
development occurs in accordance with sensi-
ble long-range transportation planning" qual-
ifies as a legitimate public purpose. Howev-
er, the County has not demonstrated why, in 
the interest of transportation planning, BAM 
must convey the right-of-way to the County 
outright, instead of, for example, implement-
ing a set-back requirement that would pro-
hibit BAM and similarly situated property 
owners from erecting structures that could 
complicate the future widening of 3500 
South. 
H 69 Similarly, the anticipated three to four 
percent increase in traffic congestion caused 
by the subdivision does not, by itself, justify 
the County's dedication requirement, which 
in essence requires BAM to pay for 100 
percent of the cost of the County's long-
range transportation goal of widening 3500 
South, at least as to the portion of 3500 
South that abuts BAM's property. Any ar-
gument the County makes to the contrary is 
fatally hobbled by its repeated assertions 
that "the County highway-dedication require-
ment operates mdependently of any unique 
characteristics or proposed uses of specific 
parcels to which it applies." While it is clear 
that the County employed such reasoning to 
convince the court that Nollan and Dolan do 
not apply to this case, it still leaves the 
County a "far cry" from the "individualized 
determination" required by Dolan. Id. at 
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319. See 1 Nichols, Emi-
28. Although Dolan does not require "precise 
mathematical calculation," it does not preclude a 
mathematical inquiry, and the Court in fact con-
sidered such evidence m Dolan 512 US at 
391, 395, 114 S Ct at 2319, 2321 In any event, 
mathematical calculations, while not required, 
are at least one way to show an exaction is not 
roughly proportional to the impact of the pro-
posed development See Art Piculell Group v 
Clackamas County, 142 OrApp 327, 922 P 2d 
1227, 1235 (1996) ("[Dolan ] m fact requires 
1-239 (3d ed. 
2002) ("[WJhere the need for a road is sub-
stantially generated by public traffic de-
mands, rather than by the proposed develop-
ment, eminent domain must be used rather 
than the police power.").28 Cf. Sparks v. 
Douglas County, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 
738, 741, 746 (1995) (upholding county dedica-
tion requirements where proposed develop-
ment "would approximately double traffic" 
along adjacent streets). 
11 70 Under Dolan, the County "must make 
some sort of individualized determination 
that the required dedication is related both 
in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. There appears to 
be no such evidence in the record before us. 
While it is agreed that community develop-
ment and transportation planning are worthy 
goals, the County should not be permitted to 
implement these goals in an unconstitutional 
fashion by avoiding the compensation re-
quirement.29 "Rather, [the County] is free to 
advance its comprehensive program, if it 
wishes, by using its power of eminent domain 
for this public purpose, but if it wants [a 
right-of-way] across [BAM's] property, it 
must pay for it." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842-43, 
107 S.Ct. at 3151 (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
H 71 The County's exaction requiring dedi-
cation of a fifty-three-foot nght-of-way along 
3500 South Street constitutes a taking of 
BAM's property under both the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and Article I, Section 22, of the Utah 
Constitution. BAM is entitled to just com-
pensation for its property, and this court 
should reverse and remand for determination 
some quantification [and thus] such information, 
although not necessarily determinative, may be 
considered ") (emphasis in original) 
29. It is acknowledged that the County may valid-
ly administer these goals via its dedication ordi-
nance Nevertheless, the County should not be 
permitted to short circuit the just compensation 
requirement by reading its ordinance to require 
landowners to dedicate their property for free 
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of an appropriate award.30 Such award 
should reflect unrebutted evidence that the 
County's dedication requirement caused 
BAM to lose two lots that it could have 
otherwise developed. See, e.g., City of Hil-
dale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56,1119, 28 P.3d 697 
(" '[Landowners must be put in as good a 
position money wise as they would have occu-
pied had their property not been taken.'") 
(quoting State v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 43, 305 
P.2d 495, 497 (1957)). 
JTH\ . 
( O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
2004 UT App 44 
Barry KELLY, individually and in the 
right of Wapiti Heights, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
HARD MONEY FUNDING, INC., a Utah 
corporation; each assignee of a benefi-
cial interest of a certain trust deed; 
Gary A. Weston, as trustee under a cer-
tain trust deed; M.V.I.; JJ Associates; 
and V.C.I., Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20020854-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 4, 2004. 
Background: Member of limited liability 
company brought quiet title and declarato-
ry judgment action, on behalf of company 
and in his individual capacity, against lend-
er who held security interest in properties 
once owned by the company. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
William B. Bohling, J., granted lender's 
30. To the extent BAM has successfully persuaded 
me of the fundamental soundness of its position, 
that success should not be attributed, in any 
degree, to its counsel's unrestrained and unnec-
essary use of the bold, underline, and "all caps" 
functions of word processing or his repeated use 
of exclamation marks to emphasize points in his 
briefs Nor are the briefs he filed in this case 
unique Rather, BAM's counsel has regularly 
employed these devices in prior appeals to this 
motion for summary judgment, and denied 
member's motion to amend his complaint. 
Member appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Norman 
H. Jackson, J., held that: 
(1) member did not have standing to bring 
quiet title action against lender on 12 
of company's properties that were 
transferred at foreclosure sale; 
(2) misnomer of grantee in warranty deed 
transferring seven of company's prop-
erties did not invalidate the transfer; 
and 
(3) trial court abused its discretion in de-
nying member's motion to amend his 
complaint to add interference with con-
tractual relations and breach of fiducia-
ry duty claims against lender. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded 
in part. 
Russell W. Bench, J., concurred in the result. 
1. Appeal and Error <S>761 
Declaratory Judgment <s>392.1 
Argument by member of limited liability 
company in appeal of quiet title and declara-
tory judgment action against lender who had 
security interest in properties once owned by 
company, that purported involvement by 
lender in scheme of other members of com-
pany to defraud company should act as 
grounds to subordinate lender's interest in 
the properties to member's own claims 
against other members, would not be ad-
dressed on appeal, though member alluded to 
argument in his various discussions of the 
alleged mvolvement of lender in the various 
machinations of other members, where mem-
ber had not specifically argued subordination 
issue in his appellate brief, and did not pro-
court While I appreciate a zealous advocate as 
much as anyone, such techniques, which really 
amount to a written form of shouting, are simply 
inappropriate m an appellate brief It is coun-
terproductive for counsel to litter his brief with 
burdensome material such as "WRONG1 
WRONG ANALYSIS' WRONG RESULT' 
WRONG' WRONG' WRONG'" It is also at 
odds with Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure 
APPENDIX "2" 
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances 
§§ 15.28.010; 18.080.010; 18.24.010 
Title 15 BUILDINGS AND CONSTRUCTION 
Chapter 15.28 HIGHWAY DEDICATION 
15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.020, no building or structure shall be erected, 
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged, and no building permit shall be issued therefor, on 
any lot or parcel of land which abuts a major or secondary highway, as shown on the map 
entitled, "The County Transportation Improvement Plan," on file with the planning and 
development services division and made part of this chapter by reference, or other public street 
which does not conform to current county width standards, unless the portion of such lot or parcel 
within the right-of-way of the highway to be widened or additional required street width has been 
dedicated to the county and improved. The dedication and improvements shall meet the 
standards for such highway or street as provided in Section 15.28.060. (Ord. 1473 (part), 2001: 
Ord. 961 § 1 (part), 1986: prior code § 2-6-1) 
Title 18 SUBDIVISIONS 
Chapter 18.08 GENERAL REGULATIONS 
18.08.010 Procedure generally. 
Before subdividing any tract or lot or parcel of land into two or more lots, a subdivider shall: 
A. Prior to or coincident with the submission of the preliminary plat, file with the planning 
commission a completed subdivision information form or forms to be furnished by the planning 
commission; 
B. File with the planning commission for examination and subsequent approval or disapproval, 
nineteen black and white prints of the preliminary plat prepared in conformance with the 
provisions of this title. Prints shall be filed at least fifteen days prior to the planning commission 
meeting at which the plat is to be considered, and shall be accompanied by a filing fee as 
provided for in Section 3.52.020; 
C. Within two years after receiving approval of the preliminary plat by the planning commission, 
submit the original and one copy of the final plat to the planning commission for final approval or 
disapproval, as the case may be. The planning commission may grant a one-year extension of 
such time period if the request for extension is received prior to the expiration date. In approving 
any extension, the planning commission may review and modify or amend the original approval 
conditions and requirements; 
D. Present, after receiving final approval by the planning commission, the original of the final plat 
to the county council; 
E. Obtain final approval by the county council, which shall deposit the final plat bearing all official 
approvals as required in this title in the office of the county recorder for recording at the expense 
of the subdivider, who shall be notified of such deposit by the county recorder. Approval of the 
final plat by the planning commission shall be void if the plat is not recorded within one year after 
the date of approval, unless application for an extension of time is made in writing to the planning 
commission and granted during the one-year period; 
F. The water supply and sewage disposal shall have been approved by the health department. 
(Ord. 1473 (part), 2001: Ord. 1222 § 3,1993: Ord. 1073 § 2, 1989; Ord. 879 (part), 1983; Ord. 
795, 1982; prior code § 19-2-1) 
Title 18 SUBDIVISIONS 
Chapter 18.24 REQUIRED IMPROVEMENTS 
18.24.010 Certification of improvements. 
No final plat of a subdivision of land shall be recorded, except as provided in Section 18.08.030, 
without receiving a statement signed by the planning and development services division certifying 
that the improvements described in the subdivided plans and specifications have been 
completed, that they meet the minimum requirements of all ordinances of the county, that they 
comply with the standards and requirements of the health department, the planning and 
development services division, the planning commission and the county fire department. (Ord. 
1473 (part), 2001: Ord. 879 (part), 1983: prior code § 19-5-1 (part)) 
